Neutrality and Force in Field’s epistemological objection to platonism

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Neutrality and Force in Field’s epistemological objection to platonism
المؤلفون: Sjölin Wirling, Ylwa
المصدر: Inquiry. 67(9):3461-3480
مصطلحات موضوعية: Philosophy, Filosofi, abstract objects, Benacerraf problem, Epistemology of mathematics, Hartry Field, mathematical platonism
الوصف: Field’s challenge to platonists is the challenge to explain the reliable match between mathematical truth and belief. The challenge grounds an objection claiming that platonists cannot provide such an explanation. This objection is often taken to be both neutral with respect to controversial epistemological assumptions, and a comparatively forceful objection against platonists. I argue that these two characteristics are in tension: no construal of the objection in the current literature realises both, and there are strong reasons to think that no version of Field’s epistemological objection which has both Neutrality and Force can be construed.
URL الوصول: https://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/314754
قاعدة البيانات: SwePub
الوصف
تدمد:0020174X
15023923
DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2022.2048689