Dissertation/ Thesis
Fee Dependence, Corporate Governance Risk and Earnings Conservatism
| العنوان: | Fee Dependence, Corporate Governance Risk and Earnings Conservatism |
|---|---|
| Alternate Title: | 公費依存度、公司治理風險與盈餘穩健性之關係 |
| المؤلفون: | Ya-Lan Yang, 楊雅嵐 |
| Thesis Advisors: | Jia-Xun Jiang, 姜家訓 |
| سنة النشر: | 2005 |
| المجموعة: | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| الوصف: | 93 This thesis examines the relationship among fee dependence, corporate governance risk and earnings conservatism. The definition of earnings conservatism is based on Basu(1997): the differential verifiability requires the asymmetrical verification recognition of profits versus losses. The empirical measure of earnings conservatism is based on the estimated slope coefficient of reverse regression model developed by Basu(1997). I use publicly disclosed fee data of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during the period from 2002 to 2003 which is required by the regulation that became effective in 2002 to examine the effects of fee dependence on earnings conservatism. The proxies for fee dependence include a dummy of fee disclosure, non-audit fee ratio (Frankel et al. 2002), the natural log of non-audit fees and total fees (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Measures of corporate governance risk include stock ownership of directors, pledged shares of directors, the existence of independent directors and supervisors, blockholder shareholdings, institutional holdings, size and leverage. Since prior researches indicate that neglecting the interaction between corporate governance risk and audit decision might bias the empirical results, this study also explores the interaction between corporate governance risk and fee dependence. The empirical results show that earnings in Taiwan demonstrate the characteristic of earnings conservatism, and this means earnings is more timely and sensitive in reflecting publicly available bad news than good news. Except for the measure of fee disclose, the rest of the proxies show that the higher the fee dependence, the higher the earnings conservatism will be. This means auditors will demand higher earnings conservatism and maintain higher level of independence in appearance to avoid litigation and regulation cost as well as reputation loss. The empirical results about the effects of corporate governance risk on earnings conservatism show that corporate governance risk affects earnings conservatism. The higher the corporate governance risk is, the higher is the earnings conservatism. Besides, the relationship between fee dependence and earnings conservatism will be affected by the level of corporate governance risk. As the corporate governance risk gets higher, auditors will demand more earnings conservatism for given magnitude of fee dependent to mitigate the concern of impairment of independence in appearance. In contrast, when corporate governance risk is low, the impact of fee dependence on earnings conservatism will decrease because the risk of financial statement misstatements reduces. Finally, the empirical results find that ex-ante conservatism has significant impacts on ex-post conservatism. This implies that researchers should control the effect of ex-ante conservatism when they take ex-post conservatism (such as earnings conservatism based on Basu 1997) at their empirical measure of conservatism. |
| Original Identifier: | 093FJU00385004 |
| نوع الوثيقة: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| وصف الملف: | 96 |
| الاتاحة: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17219532274269845571 |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsndl.TW.093FJU00385004 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
| الوصف غير متاح. |