Academic Journal

Modeling Bayesian inspection game for non-performing loan problems

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Modeling Bayesian inspection game for non-performing loan problems
المؤلفون: Erwin Widodo, Oryza Akbar Rochmadhan, Lukmandono, Januardi
المصدر: Operations Research Perspectives, Vol 9, Iss , Pp 100218- (2022)
بيانات النشر: Elsevier, 2022.
سنة النشر: 2022
المجموعة: LCC:Mathematics
مصطلحات موضوعية: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Inspection game, Non-performing loan, Mathematics, QA1-939
الوصف: This study compiled a Bayesian inspection game as a branch in game theory to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs). Three types of games are analyzed, which are false alarm (FA), non-detection (ND), and bull's eye (BE). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium calculation process took place to formulate the player's strategy proportion. The equilibrium solution indicates the causative factors and develops the strategies to anticipate NPLs. The identified factors causing NPLs include customers' utility and disutility, inspection error in the form of false alarm and non-detection, operational costs to conduct an inspection, and bank utility related to inspection. The results showed that some examinations of type I and II errors to the game model could provide more comprehensive and interesting insights in managing NPL problems.
نوع الوثيقة: article
وصف الملف: electronic resource
اللغة: English
تدمد: 2214-7160
Relation: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214716021000324; https://doaj.org/toc/2214-7160
DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2021.100218
URL الوصول: https://doaj.org/article/5ad58760bd4a4e7c92ee87e3767a4e06
رقم الانضمام: edsdoj.5ad58760bd4a4e7c92ee87e3767a4e06
قاعدة البيانات: Directory of Open Access Journals
الوصف
تدمد:22147160
DOI:10.1016/j.orp.2021.100218