Academic Journal
Is There Anything Like Moral Character or Virtue? ; Czy istnieje coś, co zwiemy moralnym charakterem i cnotą?
| العنوان: | Is There Anything Like Moral Character or Virtue? ; Czy istnieje coś, co zwiemy moralnym charakterem i cnotą? |
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| المؤلفون: | Szutta, Natasza, Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego |
| المصدر: | Academicon Press; ; Wydawnictwo Academicon |
| بيانات النشر: | Academicon Press Wydawnictwo Academicon |
| سنة النشر: | 2017 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | ethics, virtue, character, situationism, moral character, virtue ethics, Aristotle, aretic language, eudaimonia, moral, dispositionism, moral psychology, etyka, cnota, etyka cnót, moralność, charakter, dyspozycja moralna, sytuacjonizm, charakter moralny, Arystoteles, język aretyczny, dyspozycjonizm, eudajmonia, psychologia moralności |
| الوصف: | The main aim of my monography entitled Czy istnieje coś, co zwiemy moralnym charakterem i cnotą? Dyskusja z sytuacjonistyczną krytyką etyki cnót (Is There Anything Like Moral Character and Virtue? Discussion with Situationistic Critique of Virtue Ethics), Wydawnictwo Academicon 2017, pp. 495, is to inquire whether and to what degree the situationistic criticism of virtue ethics undermines this prominent ethical approach. Situationists (ethicists inspired by the results of the research in social and cognitive psychology) maintain that virtue ethics is founded on empirically unconfirmed moral psychology, and thus it is empirically inadequate. The other goals, realized in consequent parts of the book are: 1) presentation and argumentation for the main claims of the contemporary virtue ethics; 2) the presentation of claims, arguments and postulates put forward by situationists who criticize contemporary virtue ethics; 3) the response to the situationistic criticism from the perspective of virtue ethics. In the first part I set off with the outline of the beginnings of virtue ethics, then I proceed to explain the notion of eudaimoniaunderstood in terms of a goal of human life, present ethical virtues as necessary means to a fulfilled human life, and I try to answer the question why moral education is a very important part of ethics. In the second part I refer to the empirical data which are used by the situationistic critics of virtue ethics. In the third part I offer a twofold response to the situationists criticism: a negative one and positive one. The former consists in pointing various methodological errors committed by situationists which led them to draw too radical and too early conclusions. The latter consists in presenting various, empirically grounded psychological theories, which may serve as empirical foundation for contemporary virtue ethics. All my argumentation aims at pointing out that the latest empirical data, gained within moral psychology, do not undermine contemporary virtue ethics. On the ... |
| نوع الوثيقة: | text |
| وصف الملف: | Digital (DA) |
| اللغة: | Polish |
| Relation: | https://omp.academicon.pl/wa/catalog/view/2/1/1; https://omp.academicon.pl/wa/catalog/book/2 |
| الاتاحة: | https://omp.academicon.pl/wa/catalog/book/2 |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.EDA90DE2 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |