Academic Journal
Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack Resilience against PRESENT Lightweight Block Cipher
| العنوان: | Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack Resilience against PRESENT Lightweight Block Cipher |
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| المؤلفون: | Gunathilake, Nilupulee A., Al-Dubai, Ahmed, Buchanan, William J., Lo, Owen |
| بيانات النشر: | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| سنة النشر: | 2022 |
| المجموعة: | Edinburgh Napier Repository (Napier University Edinburgh) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Lightweight cryptology, PRESENT cipher, electromagnetic side-channel analysis |
| الوصف: | Lightweight cryptography is a novel diversion from conventional cryptography that targets internet-of-things (IoT) platform due to resource constraints. In comparison, it offers smaller cryptographic primitives such as shorter key sizes, block sizes and lesser energy drainage. The main focus can be seen in algorithm developments in this emerging subject. Thus, verification is carried out based upon theoretical (mathematical) proofs mostly. Among the few available side-channel analysis studies found in literature, the highest percentage is taken by power attacks. PRESENT is a promising lightweight block cipher to be included in IoT devices in the near future. Thus, the emphasis of this paper is on lightweight cryptology, and our investigation shows unavailability of a correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) of it. Hence, in an effort to fill in this research gap, we opted to investigate the capabilities of CEMA against the PRESENT algorithm. This work aims to determine the probability of secret key leakage with a minimum number of electromagnetic (EM) waveforms possible. The process initially started from a simple EM analysis (SEMA) and gradually enhanced up to a CEMA. This paper presents our methodology in attack modelling, current results that indicate a probability of leaking seven bytes of the key and upcoming plans for optimisa-tion. In addition, introductions to lightweight cryptanalysis and theories of EMA are also included. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| Relation: | http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/2869629; https://napier-repository.worktribe.com/file/2869629/1/Electromagnetic%20Side-Channel%20Attack%20Resilience%20Against%20PRESENT%20Lightweight%20Block%20Cipher |
| DOI: | 10.1109/CSP55486.2022.00018 |
| الاتاحة: | https://doi.org/10.1109/CSP55486.2022.00018 https://napier-repository.worktribe.com/file/2869629/1/Electromagnetic%20Side-Channel%20Attack%20Resilience%20Against%20PRESENT%20Lightweight%20Block%20Cipher http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/Output/2869629 |
| Rights: | openAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.E15A68B8 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1109/CSP55486.2022.00018 |
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