Academic Journal
Debt Overhang and Lack of Lender's Commitment
| العنوان: | Debt Overhang and Lack of Lender's Commitment |
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| المؤلفون: | KOBAYASHI, KEIICHIRO, NAKAJIMA, TOMOYUKI, TAKAHASHI, SHUHEI |
| المساهمون: | 髙橋, 修平 |
| بيانات النشر: | Wiley Ohio State University |
| سنة النشر: | 2023 |
| المجموعة: | Kyoto University Research Information Repository (KURENAI) / 京都大学学術情報リポジトリ |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | backloading, debt Laffer curve, two-sided lack of commitment |
| الوصف: | The debt overhang of sovereigns or firms is modeled in the recent literature as a constrained efficient outcome of dynamic debt contracts under the lack of the borrower's commitment, where debt relief is not Pareto-improving. The early literature observes another type of debt overhang where the borrower is discouraged from expending effort, anticipating the lender to take all output ex post. We show that this inefficiency is due to the lack of the lender's commitment and debt relief is Pareto-improving. Nevertheless, debt overhang may persist, as frictional bargaining over debt relief can take a long time. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| تدمد: | 0022-2879 1538-4616 |
| Relation: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/286774; Journal of Money, Credit and Banking; 55; 2153; 2185 |
| الاتاحة: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/286774 |
| Rights: | © 2022 The Authors. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Ohio State University. ; This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. ; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.DE707FF3 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
Full Text Finder | تدمد: | 00222879 15384616 |
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