Report
Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation
| العنوان: | Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Bruttel, Lisa Verena, Felgendreher, Simon, Güth, Werner, Hertwig, Ralph |
| سنة النشر: | 2019 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | ddc:150, ddc:330, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA), psy, eco |
| الوصف: | Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | report |
| اللغة: | English |
| Relation: | https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/43188/cepa10.pdf; https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/43188 |
| الاتاحة: | https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/43188/cepa10.pdf https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/43188 |
| Rights: | undefined |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.C9C90702 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |