Academic Journal

Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
المؤلفون: Aloisio Araujo, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, Humberto Moreira
المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
المصدر: http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf.
سنة النشر: 2004
المجموعة: CiteSeerX
مصطلحات موضوعية: auctions, pure strategy equilibria, non-monotonic bidding functions, tie-breaking
الوصف: We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an exogenous and explicit tie breaking mechanism. As a basis for these results, we obtain a characterization lemma that is valid under a general setting, that includes non-independent types, asymmetrical utilities and any attitude towards risk. Such characterization gives a basis for an intuitive interpretation for the behavior of the bidder: to bid in order to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of bidding.
نوع الوثيقة: text
وصف الملف: application/pdf
اللغة: English
Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.131.7381; http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf
الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.131.7381
http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf
Rights: Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.B9151D3E
قاعدة البيانات: BASE