Academic Journal
Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
العنوان: | Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions |
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المؤلفون: | Aloisio Araujo, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, Humberto Moreira |
المساهمون: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
المصدر: | http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf. |
سنة النشر: | 2004 |
المجموعة: | CiteSeerX |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | auctions, pure strategy equilibria, non-monotonic bidding functions, tie-breaking |
الوصف: | We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an exogenous and explicit tie breaking mechanism. As a basis for these results, we obtain a characterization lemma that is valid under a general setting, that includes non-independent types, asymmetrical utilities and any attitude towards risk. Such characterization gives a basis for an intuitive interpretation for the behavior of the bidder: to bid in order to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of bidding. |
نوع الوثيقة: | text |
وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
اللغة: | English |
Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.131.7381; http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf |
الاتاحة: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.131.7381 http://epge.fgv.br/portal/arquivo/1608.pdf |
Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.B9151D3E |
قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
الوصف غير متاح. |