التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy |
| المؤلفون: |
Benedettini, Simona, Nicita, Antonio |
| المجموعة: |
RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) |
| الوصف: |
We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur. ; Offsetting behavior; Point-record driving license; Seat belts; Traffic law enforcement; Traffic fatalities |
| نوع الوثيقة: |
article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: |
unknown |
| Relation: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818812000075 |
| الاتاحة: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818812000075 |
| رقم الانضمام: |
edsbas.B7E615CA |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
BASE |