Academic Journal

Competition between Firms that Bundle Information Goods

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Competition between Firms that Bundle Information Goods
المؤلفون: Scott A. Fay
المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
المصدر: http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/~scottfay/bundle.ps.
بيانات النشر: Unpublished
سنة النشر: 1999
المجموعة: CiteSeerX
الوصف: Information goods, such as journal articles, require substantial investment. But once the original content has been created, it is very inexpensive to produce additional copies. Recent technological advances in computing and digital communication have made possible even lower duplication and distribution expenses through electronic delivery. This cost structure poses a difficulty. Charging per-unit prices is inefficient since it restricts individuals from reading articles that can be cheaply replicated. However, if prices are lowered to the incremental cost of producing additional copies, then firms will not recover their substantial first-copy costs and thus will not have an incentive to invest in producing original content. Bundling -- selling a multitude of information goods for a single price --- may be desirable in such a market. Once the bundle has been bought, individuals pay no extra fee for each item consumed and thus read all the content that they find valuable. Y.
نوع الوثيقة: text
وصف الملف: application/postscript
اللغة: English
Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.27.8277; http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/~scottfay/bundle.ps
الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.27.8277
http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/~scottfay/bundle.ps
Rights: Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.B3000D84
قاعدة البيانات: BASE