Academic Journal
Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
| العنوان: | Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal |
| المساهمون: | The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives |
| المصدر: | http://www2.ku.edu/%7Ekuwpaper/2009Papers/201003.pdf. |
| سنة النشر: | 2012 |
| المجموعة: | CiteSeerX |
| الوصف: | In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover, in GSS, global stability is equivalent to dominance solvability, showing that in this class of games, two different foundations for robustness of predicted outcomes are equivalent, and both can be checked using a single best response dynamic. These equivalences are useful to study stability of equilibria in a variety of applications. Furthermore, in parameterized GSS, under natural conditions, dynamically stable equilibrium selections can be viewed in terms of monotone selections of equilibria. Several examples are provided. JEL Numbers: C70, C72, C62 |
| نوع الوثيقة: | text |
| وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
| اللغة: | English |
| Relation: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1085.385; http://www2.ku.edu/%7Ekuwpaper/2009Papers/201003.pdf |
| الاتاحة: | http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1085.385 http://www2.ku.edu/%7Ekuwpaper/2009Papers/201003.pdf |
| Rights: | Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it. |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.92BE2CF4 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |