Academic Journal
Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads
| العنوان: | Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Jacob, Julien, Lambert, Eve-Angéline, Lefebvre, Mathieu, van Driessche, Sarah |
| المساهمون: | Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), AgroParisTech-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar (Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA))-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Financial support of the CPER Ariane, ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-11-IDEX-0001,Amidex,INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE(2011) |
| المصدر: | ISSN: 0176-1714. |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD Springer Verlag |
| سنة النشر: | 2023 |
| المجموعة: | Université de Lorraine: HAL |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Information disclosure, Common harms, Environmental Regulation, Liability Sharing Rules, Public Bads, Multiple Tortfeasors, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K1 - Basic Areas of Law/K.K1.K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability • Forensic Economics, JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law/K.K3.K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance |
| الوصف: | International audience ; We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| ردمك: | 978-0-00-903978-2 0-00-903978-3 |
| Relation: | hal-03922400; https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400; https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400/document; https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400/file/Information%20disclosure%20under%20liability_Article_final.pdf; WOS: WOS:000903978300001 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-022-01444-0 |
| الاتاحة: | https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400 https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400/document https://amu.hal.science/hal-03922400/file/Information%20disclosure%20under%20liability_Article_final.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01444-0 |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.7A8ABCCB |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| ردمك: | 9780009039782 0009039783 |
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| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-022-01444-0 |