Report
Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: an axiomatic approach
| العنوان: | Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: an axiomatic approach |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Lowing, David, Munich, Léa, Techer, Kevin |
| المساهمون: | CentraleSupélec, Laboratoire Génie Industriel (LGI), CentraleSupélec-Université Paris-Saclay, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), AgroParisTech-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar (Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA))-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) (CRESE), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté COMUE (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté COMUE (UBFC), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM) |
| المصدر: | https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04428081 ; 2024. |
| بيانات النشر: | CCSD |
| سنة النشر: | 2024 |
| المجموعة: | Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne: HAL |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Cooperative game theory, Cost allocation, Public service, Cross-subsidization, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games, JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin] |
| الوصف: | Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To ompensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activitiesand obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | report |
| اللغة: | English |
| الاتاحة: | https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04428081 https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04428081v1/document https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04428081v1/file/WP-2024-05.pdf |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.5E957A11 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |