Academic Journal

Discussion Paper Series Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Discussion Paper Series Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars
المؤلفون: Matthew O. Jackson, Massimo Morelli, Matthew O. Jackson Y, Massimo Morelli Z
المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
المصدر: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0708-04.pdf.
سنة النشر: 2007
المجموعة: CiteSeerX
مصطلحات موضوعية: JEL Classi…cation Numbers, C78, D74 Keywords, War, Arms, Arms Races, Peace, Militarization, Hawks, Deterents and Doves
الوصف: We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve “dove,”“hawk,”and “deterrent”strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with di¤ering armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. Finally, as it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiation is not available. This matches observed patterns in the data over time.
نوع الوثيقة: text
وصف الملف: application/pdf
اللغة: English
Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.183.7729; http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0708-04.pdf
الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.183.7729
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0708-04.pdf
Rights: Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.5E720AB
قاعدة البيانات: BASE