Conference
Tariff Versus Sanction Under Bounded Rationality
| العنوان: | Tariff Versus Sanction Under Bounded Rationality |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Pokou, Fredy, Fochesato, Marta, Cadre, Hélène Le |
| المساهمون: | Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure (INOCS), Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ETH, This work was partially funded by the Région Hauts-de-France through the STaRS project SITAR. |
| المصدر: | NETGCOOP 2024 ; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04609200 ; NETGCOOP 2024, Oct 2024, Lille, France |
| بيانات النشر: | CCSD |
| سنة النشر: | 2024 |
| المجموعة: | LillOA (HAL Lille Open Archive, Université de Lille) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Game Theory, Sanction Design, Cumulative Prospect Theory, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC] |
| جغرافية الموضوع: | Lille, France |
| الوصف: | International audience ; We formulate the design of a taxation mechanism as a Stackelberg gameassuming: a) perfect competition, with exogenous prices; b) imperfect competition, captured through a variational inequality approach, with endogenous prices. Three settings of the mechanism are considered: (i) benchmark involving no taxation, (ii) optimum tariff, (iii) optimum sanction. The expected utility maximization formulation of the gameis extended further by relying on cumulative prospect theory to account for the bounded rationality of the stakeholders. We derive closed-form mappings linking the outcomes of the three settings. Additionally, we assess the impact of bounded rationality through anew performance metric, the Price of Irrationality. Numerical results are derived on a randomized instance of a gas trading game between Europe, Asia, and Russia. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | conference object |
| اللغة: | English |
| الاتاحة: | https://inria.hal.science/hal-04609200 https://inria.hal.science/hal-04609200v3/document https://inria.hal.science/hal-04609200v3/file/Pokou_Le_Cadre_Fochesato_True_version.pdf |
| Rights: | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.577CD8B7 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| الوصف غير متاح. |