Academic Journal
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
| العنوان: | Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players |
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| المؤلفون: | Ewerhart, Christian |
| المصدر: | Ewerhart, Christian (2017). Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players. Economics Letters, 157:167-170. |
| بيانات النشر: | Elsevier |
| سنة النشر: | 2017 |
| المجموعة: | University of Zurich (UZH): ZORA (Zurich Open Repository and Archive |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Department of Economics, 330 Economics, Tullock contest, nash equilibrium, heterogeneous valuations, discrimination |
| الوصف: | It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
| اللغة: | English |
| تدمد: | 0165-1765 |
| Relation: | https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137301/1/Revenue_ranking_Ewerhart.pdf; urn:issn:0165-1765 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012 |
| الاتاحة: | https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137301/ https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137301/1/Revenue_ranking_Ewerhart.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012 |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess ; Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) ; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.55EF78B2 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| تدمد: | 01651765 |
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| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012 |