Academic Journal

As Soon as Possible but Rationally

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: As Soon as Possible but Rationally
المؤلفون: Bruyère, Véronique, Grandmont, Christophe, Raskin, Jean-François
المساهمون: Véronique Bruyère and Christophe Grandmont and Jean-François Raskin
بيانات النشر: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
سنة النشر: 2024
المجموعة: DROPS - Dagstuhl Research Online Publication Server (Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz Center for Informatics )
مصطلحات موضوعية: Games played on graphs, rational verification, rational synthesis, Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimality, quantitative reachability objectives
الوصف: This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In these games, one player, referred to as the system, declares his strategy upfront. The other players, composing the environment, then rationally make their moves according to their objectives. The rational behavior of these responding players is captured through two models: they opt for strategies that either represent a Nash equilibrium or lead to a play with a Pareto-optimal cost tuple.
نوع الوثيقة: article in journal/newspaper
conference object
وصف الملف: application/pdf
اللغة: English
Relation: Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 311, 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2024); https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14
الاتاحة: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-207869
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14
Rights: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.3D578FC4
قاعدة البيانات: BASE
الوصف
DOI:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14