Academic Journal
Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool
| العنوان: | Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool |
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| المؤلفون: | Lévy-Garboua, Louis, Montmarquette, Claude, Vaksmann, Jonathan, Villeval, Marie-Claire |
| المساهمون: | Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux (GAINS), Le Mans Université (UM), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-11-IDEX-0007,Avenir L.S.E.,PROJET AVENIR LYON SAINT-ETIENNE(2011), ANR-11-LABX-0042,CORTEX,Construction, Fonction Cognitive et Réhabilitation du Cerveau(2011) |
| المصدر: | ISSN: 1097-3923. |
| بيانات النشر: | CCSD Wiley |
| سنة النشر: | 2017 |
| المجموعة: | Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne: HAL |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | mutual-aid games, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance |
| الوصف: | International audience ; We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution-based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no-insurance equilibrium while contribution-based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a \dual interior equilibrium". That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co-existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context. |
| نوع الوثيقة: | article in journal/newspaper |
| اللغة: | English |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jpet.12181 |
| الاتاحة: | https://hal.science/hal-01476440 https://hal.science/hal-01476440v1/document https://hal.science/hal-01476440v1/file/MutualInsurance_JPET_R%26R2_08092015.pdf https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12181 |
| Rights: | info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsbas.3186A149 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | BASE |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jpet.12181 |
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