On being internally the same

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: On being internally the same
المؤلفون: Parrott, M, Gomes, AD
المساهمون: Kriegel, U
بيانات النشر: Oxford University Press
سنة النشر: 2020
المجموعة: Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
الوصف: Internalism and externalism disagree about whether agents who are internally the same can differ in their mental states. But what is it for two agents to be internally the same? Standard formulations take agents to be internally the same in virtue of some metaphysical fact, for example, that they share intrinsic physical properties. Our aim in this chapter is to argue that such formulations should be rejected. We provide the outlines of an alternative formulation on which agents are internally the same in virtue of facts about their epistemic capacities. The resulting formulation is one on which internalism and externalism are views about the extent to which an agent’s mental states can vary independently of the capacity for introspective discrimination. We suggest that this epistemic formulation of internalism and externalism picks out a substantive disagreement in philosophical theorizing about the nature of the mind.
نوع الوثيقة: book part
اللغة: English
Relation: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:28a6c079-4c4c-4996-b3ea-886ad98138dd; https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0011
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0011
الاتاحة: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0011
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:28a6c079-4c4c-4996-b3ea-886ad98138dd
Rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.18160546
قاعدة البيانات: BASE
الوصف
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0011