Academic Journal

tutes, Payoff

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: tutes, Payoff
المؤلفون: A Roy, Tarun Sabarwal, Sunanda Roy, Charles Moul, John Nachbar, Wilhelm Neuefeind, Anonymous Ref
المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
المصدر: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4709/1/MPRA_paper_4709.pdf.
سنة النشر: 2005
المجموعة: CiteSeerX
مصطلحات موضوعية: functions
الوصف: Strategic Substitutes This paper studies comparative statics of equilibria in models where the optimal responses under consideration are (weakly) decreasing in endogenous variables, and (weakly) increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include parameterized games of strategic substitutes. The analysis provides a sufficient condition for existence of increasing equilibria at a higher parameter value. This condition is presented first for best-response functions; it can be translated easily to payoff functions with one-dimensional individual strategy spaces, and it has a natural analogue to best-response correspondences. The condition is tight in the sense that with a weakenened condition, the same result may not obtain. The results here apply to asymmetric equilibria, and are applied to two classes of examples – Cournot duopoly and tournaments. Moreover, sufficient conditions are presented to exhibit strong comparative statics of equilibria (that is, every equilibrium at a higher parameter value is greater than a given equilibrium at a lower parameter value), and to show existence of increasing equilibrium selections. 1
نوع الوثيقة: text
وصف الملف: application/pdf
اللغة: English
Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.516.8974; http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4709/1/MPRA_paper_4709.pdf
الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.516.8974
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4709/1/MPRA_paper_4709.pdf
Rights: Metadata may be used without restrictions as long as the oai identifier remains attached to it.
رقم الانضمام: edsbas.15C34F95
قاعدة البيانات: BASE