A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cross-Ledger Swaps with Packetized Payments

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cross-Ledger Swaps with Packetized Payments
المؤلفون: Dubovitskaya, Alevtina, Ackerer, Damien, Xu, Jiahua
المصدر: Workshop Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security (2021) 177-187
سنة النشر: 2021
المجموعة: Computer Science
مصطلحات موضوعية: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
الوصف: We propose a game-theoretic framework to study the outcomes of packetized payments, a cross-ledger transaction protocol, with strategic and possibly malicious agents. We derive the transaction failure rate and demonstrate that without disciplinary mechanisms, packetized payments are likely to be incomplete. Our analysis suggests that collateral deposits can prevent malicious agents from taking advantage of the protocol. We further infer that the deposit amount should depend on the underlying asset price volatility or that it should be dynamically adjusted as the price changes.
نوع الوثيقة: Working Paper
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-63958-0_16
URL الوصول: http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.02056
رقم الانضمام: edsarx.2103.02056
قاعدة البيانات: arXiv
الوصف
DOI:10.1007/978-3-662-63958-0_16