| الوصف: |
本文讨论了在中国经济转轨过程中保证非人格化交易的一种过渡性机制:地方官员代理人机制。在转轨过程中,当正式的司法制度在合同执行上的效力还不足时,处于特定的关系网络和权力位置的地方官员能够保证某些非人格化交易的合同得到履行。这一机制的两个政治经济学含义是:(1)中国市场化改革带来了众多交易机会,但不是所有的个人都拥有同样的利用这些机会的能力。(2)市场交易所带来的收益——经济租金的分配不但取决于生产要素的边际产品价值,而且,权力也参与到了分配过程中。文章通过一个完全信息的动态博弈模型对上述思想进行了更加严格的表述。从静态的角度看,该机制具有福利上的帕累托改进特征,尽管它同时也有对福利的重新分配效应;但是,从比较静态和动态的角度看,这一机制却会产生对市场深化的阻碍作用。而且,长期使用该机制将不利于向基于正式法庭制度的合同执行机制的过渡。 The discussion of the paper is on a transitional mechanism securing the impersonal transaction in China's economic transformation,that is,the mech- anism of local administrator as proxy.Given the inefficiency of the formal juridical system on contract enforcement,a certain local administrator at a special network and on a power position can replace the court to execute some impersonal con- tracts.The two political economy implications of the mechanism are as the follows: (1) the reform produces variety of potential transaction chance,but not all of e- conomic actor can use the chance;(2) the distributing the profit from the market trade is based on the marginal product value of the production factor as well as the power structure.Using a model of dynamic game with complete information,the paper expresses again the opinion formally.We argue that,the mechanism has Pa- reto-improving effect on social welfare on the static perspective.But,on the per- spective of comparative static or dynamic analysis,the mechanism will block the market deepening process.In addition,using this mechanism to enforce contract o- ver a long period of time will be adverse to transfer to the court mechanism. |