Port state control inspections in the European Union: Do inspector's number and background matter?

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Port state control inspections in the European Union: Do inspector's number and background matter?
المؤلفون: Armando Graziano, François-Charles Wolff, Maximo Q. Mejia, Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs, Pierre Cariou
المساهمون: World Maritime University, Malmø University, Kedge Business School [Talence], Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique (LEMNA), Institut d'Économie et de Management de Nantes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes (IEMN-IAE Nantes), Université de Nantes (UN)-Université de Nantes (UN)-FR 3473 Institut universitaire Mer et Littoral (IUML), Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-Le Mans Université (UM)-Université d'Angers (UA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Université de Nantes (UN)-École Centrale de Nantes (ECN)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-Le Mans Université (UM)-Université d'Angers (UA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Université de Nantes (UN)-École Centrale de Nantes (ECN), PANORisk, École Centrale de Nantes (ECN)-Université de Nantes (UN)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université d'Angers (UA)-Le Mans Université (UM)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École Centrale de Nantes (ECN)-Université de Nantes (UN)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université d'Angers (UA)-Le Mans Université (UM)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)
بيانات النشر: HAL CCSD, 2017.
سنة النشر: 2017
مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics and Econometrics, Association (object-oriented programming), International trade, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Aquatic Science, Politics, inspection outcome, Political science, 0502 economics and business, media_common.cataloged_instance, European union, Free trade, 0505 law, General Environmental Science, media_common, 050502 law, Team composition, 050210 logistics & transportation, Port state control, business.industry, Member states, 05 social sciences, Directive, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Port State Control, business, Law
الوصف: The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector’s background influence inspection outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector’s backgrounds.
اللغة: English
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f1ee57106fae3dedb5fc4755b4347843
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01649418
Rights: OPEN
رقم الانضمام: edsair.doi.dedup.....f1ee57106fae3dedb5fc4755b4347843
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE