Social Motives and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions
| العنوان: | Social Motives and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Utz Weitzel, Stephanie Rosenkranz, Florian Lindner, Michael Kirchler |
| المساهمون: | Finance |
| المصدر: | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 127 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Lindner, F, Kirchler, M, Rosenkranz, S & Weitzel, U 2021, ' Social Motives and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions ', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 127, 104116, pp. 1-16 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104116 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 127:104116, 1-16. Elsevier |
| سنة النشر: | 2021 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Control and Optimization, SDG 16 - Peace, Minor (academic), Behavioral economics, Rank incentives, Investment game, Experimental finance, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Reputational motives, 050207 economics, Financial services, 050208 finance, Public economics, business.industry, Applied Mathematics, 05 social sciences, SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Justice and Strong Institutions, Social status, Investment decisions, Incentive, Portfolio, business, Institute for Management Research |
| الوصف: | A pervasive feature in the finance industry is relative performance, which can include extrinsic (money), intrinsic (self-image), and reputational (status) motives. In this paper, we model a portfolio decision with two assets and investigate how reputational motives (i.e., the public announcement of the winners or losers) influence risk-taking in investment decisions vis-a-vis intrinsic motives. We test our hypotheses experimentally with 864 students and 330 financial professionals. We find that reputational motives play a minor role among financial professionals, as the risk-taking of underperformers is already increased due to intrinsic motives. Student behavior, however, is mainly driven by reputational motives with risk-taking levels that come close to those of professionals when winners or losers are announced publicly. This indicates that professionals show higher levels of intrinsic (self-image) incentives to outperform others compared to non-professionals (students), but a similar behavior can be sparked among the latter by adding reputational incentives. |
| وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
| تدمد: | 0165-1889 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104116 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d165bd4a2b9aae667e9cd9b86f518d2f https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/handle/2066/247640 |
| Rights: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....d165bd4a2b9aae667e9cd9b86f518d2f |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 01651889 |
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| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104116 |