التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia |
| المؤلفون: |
Dmitrii Kofanov, Vladimir Kozlov, Alexander Libman, Nikita Zakharov |
| بيانات النشر: |
Freie Universität Berlin, 2023. |
| سنة النشر: |
2023 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
Sociology and Political Science, 300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::320 Politikwissenschaft, COVID-19, data manipulation, authoritarian regimes, incentives in federations, Russia |
| الوصف: |
This article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities. |
| DOI: |
10.17169/refubium-37116 |
| URL الوصول: |
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d0d5128f1976ef512eba1803f8b126ce |
| Rights: |
OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: |
edsair.doi.dedup.....d0d5128f1976ef512eba1803f8b126ce |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
OpenAIRE |