Strategic syndication: is bad news shared in loan syndicates?

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Strategic syndication: is bad news shared in loan syndicates?
المؤلفون: Christopher D. Williams, Regina Wittenberg Moerman, Andrea K. Down
المصدر: Review of Accounting Studies.
بيانات النشر: Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2022.
سنة النشر: 2022
مصطلحات موضوعية: Open government, Finance, History, Web syndication, Materiality (auditing), Polymers and Plastics, Exploit, Freedom of information, business.industry, General Business, Management and Accounting, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Voluntary disclosure, Loan, Accounting, Business, Business and International Management, Private information retrieval
الوصف: We investigate whether lead arrangers opportunistically withhold their private information from participant lenders and how this behavior affects the structure of loan syndicates. Using an FDA inspection database assembled through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, we show that lead arrangers hold less of a loan when the borrower experiences a bad inspection outcome prior to its issuance. This effect is stronger when lead arrangers are more likely to be informed, as measured by higher inspection materiality and lead arrangers submitting FOIA requests to the FDA prior to a loan’s issuance. Furthermore, the influence of inspection outcomes is mitigated through both voluntary disclosure by the borrower and mandatory disclosure imposed by the Open Government Initiative. Overall, our results provide robust evidence that lead arrangers exploit their informational advantage at the expense of the participant lenders.
تدمد: 1573-7136
1380-6653
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09721-0
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::958e4c4381d1dee5c79eed30eaaf24ed
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-022-09721-0
Rights: CLOSED
رقم الانضمام: edsair.doi.dedup.....958e4c4381d1dee5c79eed30eaaf24ed
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE
الوصف
تدمد:15737136
13806653
DOI:10.1007/s11142-022-09721-0