Imitation dynamics in population games on community networks
| العنوان: | Imitation dynamics in population games on community networks |
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| المؤلفون: | Lorenzo Zino, Fabio Fagnani, Giacomo Como |
| المساهمون: | Discrete Technology and Production Automation |
| المصدر: | IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 8(1), 65-76. IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC |
| بيانات النشر: | IEEE, 2020. |
| سنة النشر: | 2020 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | FOS: Computer and information sciences, 0209 industrial biotechnology, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Control and Optimization, Computer Networks and Communications, Asymptotic stability, media_common.quotation_subject, Population, Evolutionary game theory, 02 engineering and technology, Systems and Control (eess.SY), Dynamical Systems (math.DS), Electrical Engineering and Systems Science - Systems and Control, Network Systems, symbols.namesake, 020901 industrial engineering & automation, Sociology, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Convergence (routing), 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, FOS: Mathematics, Mathematics - Dynamical Systems, Special case, Evolutionary Game Theory, Distributed Learning, Population Games, education, Mathematics - Optimization and Control, media_common, Equilibrium point, education.field_of_study, Learning systems, Imitation Dynamics, Statistics, Stability analysis, Control and Systems Engineering, Nash equilibrium, Optimization and Control (math.OC), Signal Processing, symbols, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, Pairwise comparison, Imitation, Convergence, Games, Mathematical economics, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| الوصف: | We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging to a single population exchange information through pairwise interactions, whereby they get aware of the actions played by the other players and the corresponding rewards. Using this information, they can revise their current action, imitating the one of the players they interact with. The pattern of interactions regulating the learning process is determined by a community structure. First, the set of equilibrium points of such network imitation dynamics is characterized. Second, for the class of potential games and for undirected and connected community networks, global asymptotic convergence is proved. In particular, our results guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium from every fully supported initial population state in the special case when the Nash equilibria are isolated and fully supported. Examples and numerical simulations are offered to validate the theoretical results and counterexamples are discussed for scenarios when the assumptions on the community structure are not verified. Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures. Under review |
| وصف الملف: | application/pdf |
| اللغة: | English |
| تدمد: | 2325-5870 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6dbada1b3c3e2b63e1f1095dc0e3b3c5 http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2851212 |
| Rights: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi.dedup.....6dbada1b3c3e2b63e1f1095dc0e3b3c5 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 23255870 |
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