On the Success Probability of Solving Unique SVP via BKZ
العنوان: | On the Success Probability of Solving Unique SVP via BKZ |
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المؤلفون: | Eamonn W. Postlethwaite, Fernando Virdia |
المصدر: | Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2021 ISBN: 9783030752446 Public Key Cryptography (1) |
بيانات النشر: | Springer International Publishing, 2021. |
سنة النشر: | 2021 |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | Digital signature, Computer science, law, Lattice problem, Homomorphic encryption, Key encapsulation, Lattice-based cryptography, Lattice reduction, Cryptanalysis, Algorithm, Computer Science::Cryptography and Security, Block (data storage), law.invention |
الوصف: | As lattice-based key encapsulation, digital signature, and fully homomorphic encryption schemes near standardisation, ever more focus is being directed to the precise estimation of the security of these schemes. The primal attack reduces key recovery against such schemes to instances of the unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP). Dachman-Soled et al. (Crypto 2020) recently proposed a new approach for fine-grained estimation of the cost of the primal attack when using Progressive BKZ for lattice reduction. In this paper we review and extend their technique to BKZ 2.0 and provide extensive experimental evidence of its accuracy. Using this technique we also explain results from previous primal attack experiments by Albrecht et al. (Asiacrypt 2017) where attacks succeeded with smaller than expected block sizes. Finally, we use our simulators to reestimate the cost of attacking the three lattice KEM finalists of the NIST Post Quantum Standardisation Process. |
ردمك: | 978-3-030-75244-6 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-75245-3_4 |
URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::da71019d9e5480863f27dcbdd41dd974 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75245-3_4 |
Rights: | CLOSED |
رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi...........da71019d9e5480863f27dcbdd41dd974 |
قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
ردمك: | 9783030752446 |
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DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-75245-3_4 |