Differential Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced PRINTcipher: Computing Roots of Permutations

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Differential Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced PRINTcipher: Computing Roots of Permutations
المؤلفون: Erik Zenner, Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Gregor Leander
المصدر: Fast Software Encryption ISBN: 9783642217012
FSE
بيانات النشر: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
سنة النشر: 2011
مصطلحات موضوعية: Discrete mathematics, Permutation, Differential cryptanalysis, Cipher, Symmetric-key algorithm, business.industry, Linear cryptanalysis, Key (cryptography), Higher-order differential cryptanalysis, business, Mathematics, Block cipher
الوصف: At CHES 2010, the new block cipher PRINTcipher was presented. In addition to using an xor round key as is common practice for round-based block ciphers, PRINTcipher also uses key-dependent permutations. While this seems to make differential cryptanalysis difficult due to the unknown bit permutations, we show in this paper that this is not the case. We present two differential attacks that successfully break about half of the rounds of PRINTcipher, thereby giving the first cryptanalytic result on the cipher. In addition, one of the attacks is of independent interest, since it uses a mechanism to compute roots of permutations. If an attacker knows the many-round permutation πr, the algorithm can be used to compute the underlying single-round permutation π. This technique is thus relevant for all iterative ciphers that deploy key-dependent permutations. In the case of PRINTcipher, it can be used to show that the linear layer adds little to the security against differential attacks.
ردمك: 978-3-642-21701-2
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_1
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9ca6c0cc6302aaf05127141c2a2f0b07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_1
Rights: OPEN
رقم الانضمام: edsair.doi...........9ca6c0cc6302aaf05127141c2a2f0b07
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE
الوصف
ردمك:9783642217012
DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_1