Banking Panics as Endogenous Disasters and the Welfare Gains from Macroprudential Policy
| العنوان: | Banking Panics as Endogenous Disasters and the Welfare Gains from Macroprudential Policy |
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| المؤلفون: | Andrea Prestipino, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Mark Gertler |
| المصدر: | AEA Papers and Proceedings. 110:463-469 |
| بيانات النشر: | American Economic Association, 2020. |
| سنة النشر: | 2020 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Macroeconomic model, Leverage (finance), media_common.quotation_subject, Economics, General Medicine, Monetary economics, Boom, Welfare, media_common |
| الوصف: | We study the welfare effects of macroprudential policy in a macroeconomic model of banking instability. Banking panics are endogenous economic disasters caused by banks' excessive leverage during credit booms. The model matches the frequency and severity of banking panics and the statistical relationship between panics and credit booms. A simple countercyclical macroprudential rule can achieve non-negligible welfare gains. These gains rise substantially when the run probability increases during a credit boom and, ex post, if a run is actually avoided. In a model without panics in which financial crises are driven by fundamentals only, the gains are much more limited. |
| تدمد: | 2574-0776 2574-0768 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/pandp.20201022 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::557df098a3d816d04c515b38ed3e4b63 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201022 |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.doi...........557df098a3d816d04c515b38ed3e4b63 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 25740776 25740768 |
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| DOI: | 10.1257/pandp.20201022 |