| مستخلص: |
How do descriptive norms shape injunctive norm beliefs, and what does this tell us about the cognitive processes underlying social norm cognition? Across six studies (N = 2,671), we examined whether people update their injunctive norm beliefs—as well as their moral judgments and behavioral intentions—after receiving descriptive norm information about how common (or uncommon) a behavior is. Specifically, we manipulated the descriptive normativity of behaviors, describing behaviors as uncommon (20% of people were doing the behavior) or common (80% of people were doing the behavior), and the type of behavior across studies (fairness, conventional, harm, preference). To measure belief updating, we assessed beliefs prior to and after receiving information about the descriptive norm. We had three main findings: First, participants positively updated their prior injunctive norm beliefs, moral judgments, and behavioral intentions (i.e., rated behaviors more injunctively normative and moral) after receiving a common descriptive norm and negatively updated their beliefs (i.e., rated behaviors less injunctive and moral) after receiving an uncommon descriptive norm, and updated to a larger extent for the common than uncommon descriptive norm. Second, participants were more likely to update their beliefs about what is moral for others compared to what is moral for the self. Third, participants updated their beliefs to a greater extent for fairness and conventional behaviors compared to harm behaviors and preferences. Together, our findings suggest that descriptive norms shape our injunctive norm beliefs and moral judgments and help to paint a fuller picture of the social cognition of social norms. Statement of Limitations: The present work has several potential limitations. First, our data were collected via online convenience samples, which, while generally more representative than a sample of college undergraduates, potentially limits the generalizability of our findings to people more broadly, particularly those from non-Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic societies. Second, we used a limited number of vignettes as stimuli in our study. While these were stringently normed on several dimensions preinclusion, it is possible that our findings might not generalize to other normative behaviors. Third, because we used real (rather than novel) behaviors, participants likely entered our study with prior beliefs about those behaviors, potentially influencing the extent of their belief updating. However, because we were interested primarily in between-condition comparisons, this is unlikely to explain our results. Fourth, while our dependent measures are interrelated, our modeling approach treated them as independent, including each dependent measure in a different model. To account for interdependence between measures, we conducted exploratory multivariate regression models which support our initial findings. Lastly, because we assessed self-report behavioral intentions, it is possible that participants' actual behavior would diverge from their intentions—consequently, we cannot make claims about the effect of descriptive norms on behavior per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |