التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
'Blind but Oriented': Intentionality as Tendency. |
| المؤلفون: |
Caminada, Emanuele1 (AUTHOR) emanuele.caminada@kuleuven.be |
| المصدر: |
Human Studies. Mar2024, Vol. 47 Issue 1, p13-35. 23p. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*TELEOLOGY, *CONSCIOUSNESS, *INTENTION, *MURDER, *POSSIBILITY |
| People: |
SCHELER, Max, 1874-1928, HUSSERL, Edmund, 1859-1938 |
| مستخلص: |
In their descriptions of the life dynamics of tendencies as "blind but oriented," both Scheler and Husserl outline an alternative model of intentionality to Brentano's conception of mental reference to determinate objects or meanings. In my reading, their phenomenological consideration of tendential structures will reveal tendency as an essential moment of intentionality. A horizon of indeterminacy turns out to be constitutive of every intentional act as a tendency toward or away from something. This paper develops as follows: First, I will present Max Scheler's nuanced differentiation of tendential life and the systematic horizon of his model of blind but oriented tendency, which seeks to offer an alternative to the mechanism/teleology dichotomy. Second, I will present Jocelyn Benoist's framing of the same question in the opposition between blind drives and consciousness. Benoist's radical critique of the interpretation of intentionality as a tendency condenses in his clear assertion that drives cannot be intentional because they are constitutively blind. Benoist accuses Edmund Husserl of nothing less than murdering intentionality through phenomenological vivisection, i.e., by extinguishing in reflection the tension inherent in conative intention and watering down the concept of intentionality to such an extent that it also includes cognitive acts. I will therefore turn my attention to the alleged culprit. I will show that Husserl's broad concept of intentionality is not only negatively justified by the possibility of transforming tendencies into a consciousness of their implicit object, but rather positively justified by the directed dynamics of both passive and active forms of intentionality. In the conclusion I will show how Husserl's constitutive analyses move along lines akin to Scheler's insights and call for a revision of overly static interpretations of the phenomenological concepts of intentionality and teleology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
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