التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
How (and How Not) to Defend Lesser-Evil Options. |
| المؤلفون: |
Gordon-Solmon, Kerah1 kg59@queensu.ca |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2023, Vol. 20 Issue 3/4, p211-232. 22p. |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
*JUSTIFICATION (Ethics), *JUSTIFICATION (Theory of knowledge), *GOOD & evil, *EXECUTIVE power, *ETHICS, *CONSEQUENTIALISM (Ethics), *UTILITARIANISM |
| مستخلص: |
Many philosophers believe in lesser-evil justifications for doing harm: if the only way to stop a trolley from killing five is to divert it away onto one, then we may divert. But recently, Helen Frowe has argued that we do not only have the option to pursue the lesser evil: in most cases, we are so obligated. After critically assessing Frowe's argument, I develop three mutually compatible accounts of lesser-evil options, which permit, but do not obligate us to minimize harm. These are the Parity Account, the Prerogative Account, and the Permissible Moral Mistakes Account. Considerations of parity and prerogatives have arisen in this debate before, but in inchoate form. The Permissible Moral Mistakes Account introduces something new. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
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