Bargaining Failures and Merger Policy
| العنوان: | Bargaining Failures and Merger Policy |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Burguet, Roberto, Caminal, Ramon |
| المساهمون: | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España), Generalitat de Catalunya |
| المصدر: | Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC instname |
| سنة النشر: | 2014 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | endogenous mergers, merger policy, bargaining, synergies, jel:L13, bargaining, endogenous mergers, merger policy, synergies, endogenous mergers, merger policy, inefficient bargaining, synergies, antitrust, flexible protocol, jel:L41 |
| الوصف: | © 2015 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association. We study approval rules in a model where horizontal merger proposals arise endogenously as the outcome of negotiations among the firms in the industry. We make two main points. First, relatively inefficient merger proposals succeed with positive probability. That is, the negotiation process may result in a particular merger agreement despite the existence of an alternative one that would generate higher profits and higher consumer surplus. Second, the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is more stringent for all mergers than the optimal ex post rule. We also acknowledge support of Generalitat de Catalunya and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2011-29663) |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::d21a6d719351565204ffe535b16f9a39 http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/633.pdf |
| Rights: | OPEN |
| رقم الانضمام: | edsair.dedup.wf.001..d21a6d719351565204ffe535b16f9a39 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
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