المؤلفون: Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Vasiliki

المساهمون: Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion (GREGHEC ), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Texas at Austin Austin

المصدر: ISSN: 0022-3808.

مصطلحات موضوعية: interim information design, Bayesian persuasion, informed principal, Bayes-correlated equilibrium, disclosure games, unraveling, neutral optimum, verifiable types, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences

Relation: hal-04296464; https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464; https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464/document; https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464/file/infinfD-v-3.00-final03.pdf

الاتاحة: https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464
https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464/document
https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-04296464/file/infinfD-v-3.00-final03.pdf
https://doi.org/10.1086/724843

المؤلفون: Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Vasiliki

المساهمون: Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Texas at Austin Austin, University College of London London (UCL), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), ANR-19-CE26-0010,StratCom,Diffusion de l'information en présence de rationalité limitée et de canaux de transmission complexes(2019)

المصدر: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03107866 ; 2022.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Core mechanism, Bayesian persuasion, Interim information design, Neutral optimum, Informed principal, Strong-neologism proofness, Verifiable types, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

الاتاحة: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03107866
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03107866v3/document
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03107866v3/file/infinfD-v-2.10.pdf

المؤلفون: Kyung-Hye Kim, Seung-Weon Yoo, Kyong-Soo Choi

المصدر: Sustainability; Volume 11; Issue 24; Pages: 6920

مصطلحات موضوعية: poorly-informed principal, well-informed principal, inefficiency

جغرافية الموضوع: agris

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: Economic and Business Aspects of Sustainability; https://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11246920

الاتاحة: https://doi.org/10.3390/su11246920

المؤلفون: Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Vasiliki

المساهمون: Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), CEPR, University of Texas at Austin Austin, University College of London London (UCL), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), ANR-19-CE26-0010,StratCom,Diffusion de l'information en présence de rationalité limitée et de canaux de transmission complexes(2019)

المصدر: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866 ; 2021.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Core mechanism, Bayesian persuasion, Interim information design, Neutral optimum, Informed principal, Strong-neologism proofness, Verifiable types, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: halshs-03107866; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866v2/document; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866v2/file/infinfD-v-2.00.pdf

الاتاحة: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866v2/document
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866v2/file/infinfD-v-2.00.pdf

المؤلفون: Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Vasiliki

المساهمون: Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), CEPR, University of Texas at Austin Austin, University College of London London (UCL), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), ANR-19-CE26-0010,StratCom,Diffusion de l'information en présence de rationalité limitée et de canaux de transmission complexes(2019)

المصدر: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866 ; 2021.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Core mechanism, Bayesian persuasion, Interim information design, Neutral optimum, Informed principal, Strong-neologism proofness, Verifiable types, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

Relation: halshs-03107866; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866/document; https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866/file/WP_202103_.pdf

الاتاحة: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866/document
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03107866/file/WP_202103_.pdf

المؤلفون: Andriy Zapechelnyuk

المصدر: Zapechelnyuk, A 2023, ' On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ', Economic Theory . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z

مصطلحات موضوعية: information design, Economics and Econometrics, History, Polymers and Plastics, informed principal, Business and International Management, Bayesian persuasion, sequential equilibrium, implementation, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

وصف الملف: application/pdf

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ae633aea642146890846e291fecd700e
https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/331205762/ZapechelnyukA2023ETOnTheEquivalenceOfInformationDesign.pdf

المؤلفون: Koessler, Frédéric, Skreta, Basilik¯e

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C72, D82, Informed principal, consumer heterogeneity, interdependent valuations, product information disclosure, mechanism design, certification

Relation: gbv-ppn:1668340798; Journal: Theoretical Economics; Volume: 14; Year: 2019; Issue: 2; Pages: 345-371; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217080; RePEc:the:publsh:2885

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217080
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2885

المؤلفون: Diasakos, TM, Koufopoulos, K

مصطلحات موضوعية: Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, Insurance market, Adverse selection, Interim incentive efficiency, Neutral optimum, COMPETITIVE INSURANCE, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, INFORMED PRINCIPAL, SIGNALING GAMES, LABOR-MARKETS, PARETO OPTIMA, INFORMATION, CONTRACTS, EFFICIENT

Relation: http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000446949800011&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=8c4e325952a993be76947405d4bce7d5; GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2018, 111, pp. 159-186 (28); https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618300691?via%3Dihub; http://hdl.handle.net/2381/43519

الاتاحة: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618300691?via%3Dihub
http://hdl.handle.net/2381/43519
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007

المؤلفون: Koessler, F, Skreta, V

المصدر: Theoretical Economics (2018) (In press).

مصطلحات موضوعية: Informed principal, consumer heterogeneity, interdependent valuations, product information disclosure, mechanism design, certification.

وصف الملف: text

Relation: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057421/1/selling-with-evidence.pdf; https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057421/

الاتاحة: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057421/1/selling-with-evidence.pdf
https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057421/

المؤلفون: TM Diasakos, K Koufopoulos

مصطلحات موضوعية: Uncategorized, Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, Insurance market, Adverse selection, Interim incentive efficiency, Neutral optimum, COMPETITIVE INSURANCE, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, INFORMED PRINCIPAL, SIGNALING GAMES, LABOR-MARKETS, PARETO OPTIMA, INFORMATION, CONTRACTS, EFFICIENT

Relation: 2381/43519; https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/_Neutrally_Optimal_Mechanism_under_Adverse_Selection_The_canonical_insurance_problem/10238528

الاتاحة: https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/_Neutrally_Optimal_Mechanism_under_Adverse_Selection_The_canonical_insurance_problem/10238528

المؤلفون: Kwon, Suehyun

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D82, mechanism design, limited commitment, revelation principle, informed-principal problem, persistence, correlated types

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 7782; gbv-ppn:1671533186; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202008; RePec:ces:ceswps:_7782

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202008

المؤلفون: Kwon, Suehyun

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, mechanism design, limited commitment, revelation principle, informed-principal problem, persistence, correlated types

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 7513; gbv-ppn:1049588169; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198873; RePec:ces:ceswps:_7513

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198873

المؤلفون: Dosis, Anastasios

المساهمون: ESSEC Business School

المصدر: https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454 ; 2019.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Mechanism design, Informed principal, Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration

Relation: hal-02130454; https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454; https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454/document; https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454/file/WP_1905_DOSIS.pdf

الاتاحة: https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454
https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454/document
https://essec.hal.science/hal-02130454/file/WP_1905_DOSIS.pdf

المؤلفون: Mekonnen, Teddy

مصطلحات موضوعية: Informed principal, limited liability, moral hazard, neologism proof, core mechanism, neutral optimum

Relation: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3083159; eprintid:96006

الاتاحة: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3083159

المؤلفون: Jiang, Shaofei

مصطلحات موضوعية: Hard evidence, Informed principal, Signaling games, Disclosure games, Equilibrium refinement, Bayesian persuasion

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::948746ea26451e5536a714e5fb7a7b0e

المؤلفون: Kwon, Suehyun

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, information design, dynamic informed-principal problem, interdependent values, limited commitment, Myerson-Satterthwaite

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 7394; gbv-ppn:1042187541; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191419; RePec:ces:ceswps:_7394

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191419

المؤلفون: Roy, Jaideep, Serfes, Konstantinos

المصدر: Economic Theory, 2002 Oct 01. 20(3), 603-621.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25055549

المؤلفون: Kwon, Suehyun

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, information design, dynamic informed-principal problem, interdependent values, limited commitment, Myerson-Satterthwaite

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 6616; gbv-ppn:89742879X; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171080; RePec:ces:ceswps:_6616

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171080

المؤلفون: Balkenborg, Dieter, Makris, Miltiadis

مصطلحات موضوعية: Common values, Informed principal, Mechanism design, Neutral optimum

Relation: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205311500040X; S002205311500040X; http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17115; Journal of Economic Theory

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17115
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.007

المؤلفون: Beaudry, Paul, Poitevin, Michel

المصدر: Econometrica, 1993 Jul 01. 61(4), 745-782.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951762