المؤلفون: Zabojnik, Jan

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D86, J33, M52, Stock-based Compensation, Employee Stock Options, Optimal Incentive Contracts, Firm-specific Knowledge

Relation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper; No. 1325; gbv-ppn:788254499; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122026

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122026

المؤلفون: Zabojnik, Jan

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D82, D86, M52, Subjective Evaluations, Performance Feedback, Optimal Incentive Contracts

Relation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper; No. 1283; gbv-ppn:680128859; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67781

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67781

المؤلفون: Wilko Bolt, De Nederlandsche Bank, De Nederlandsche, Bank Nv

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/wo0594_tcm46-145914.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: adverse selection, moral hazard, optimal incentive contracts, supervision JEL Codes, G10, G21, G28

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.488.6066; http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/wo0594_tcm46-145914.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.488.6066
http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/wo0594_tcm46-145914.pdf

المؤلفون: Zabel, Astrid, Roe, Brian

المصدر: IED Working Paper, 7

مصطلحات موضوعية: SYSTEMÖKOLOGIE, ÖKOSYSTEMANALYSE, ÖKOSYSTEMFORSCHUNG (ÖKOLOGIE), ARBEITSANREIZE (PERSONALWIRTSCHAFT), ERFOLGSFAKTOREN (BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT), WIRTSCHAFTSTHEORIEN, NATÜRLICHE RESSOURCEN, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, UMWELTWISSENSCHAFTEN, PERFORMANCE FACTORS (BUSINESS ECONOMICS), SYSTEMS ECOLOGY, ECOSYSTEMS ANALYSIS, ECOSYSTEMS RESEARCH (ECOLOGY), optimal incentive contracts, payments for environmental services, performance incentives, distortion, NATURAL RESOURCES, WORK INCENTIVE (PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT), ECONOMIC THEORIES, info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/333.7, energy and environment

وصف الملف: application/application/pdf

Relation: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/151268

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/151268
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005830211

المؤلفون: Marino, Anthony, Zabojnik, Jan

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, J3, M5, Job Perks, Agency Problems, Optimal Incentive Contracts

Relation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper; No. 1107; gbv-ppn:522536182; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189383; RePEC:qed:wpaper:1107

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189383

المؤلفون: 최세라

المساهمون: 황인이, 경영대학 경영학과

مصطلحات موضوعية: Managerial ability, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, Delta, Matching quality, CEO turnover, Optimal incentive contracts, Sales change direction, Sales decrease

Time: 658

Relation: 000000156709; https://hdl.handle.net/10371/161864; http://dcollection.snu.ac.kr/common/orgView/000000156709; I804:11032-000000156709; 000000000040▲000000000041▲000000156709▲

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/10371/161864
http://dcollection.snu.ac.kr/common/orgView/000000156709

المؤلفون: Gerakos, Joseph, Ittner, Chris, Moers, Frank

المصدر: Gerakos , J , Ittner , C & Moers , F 2018 , ' Compensation objectives and business unit pay strategy ' , Journal of Management Accounting Research , vol. 30 , no. 2 , pp. 105-130 . https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51829

مصطلحات موضوعية: atira/keywords/jel_classifications/m41, m41 - Accounting, atira/keywords/jel_classifications/m52, m52 - Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, pay practices, broad-based equity grants, attraction, retention, motivation, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP, OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, FRINGE BENEFITS, EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, MANAGEMENT CONTROL, CONTROL-SYSTEM, ECONOMY FIRMS, EQUITY GRANTS, OPTION PLANS, PERFORMANCE

الاتاحة: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6ec17393-08cc-4320-96bb-0b6b176220e4
https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51829

المؤلفون: Joseph Gerakos, Christopher D. Ittner, Frank Moers

المساهمون: Accounting & Information Management, RS: GSBE Theme Learning and Work

المصدر: Journal of Management Accounting Research, 30(2), 105-130. American Accounting Association

مصطلحات موضوعية: retention, media_common.quotation_subject, Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, motivation, Accounting, CONTROL-SYSTEM, 0502 economics and business, ECONOMY FIRMS, EQUITY GRANTS, 050207 economics, Business and International Management, media_common, m41 - Accounting, MANAGEMENT CONTROL, Executive compensation, Public economics, ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION, m52 - Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, FRINGE BENEFITS, Compensation (psychology), 05 social sciences, Equity (finance), OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, pay practices, OPTION PLANS, PERFORMANCE, Incentive, Strategic business unit, Cash, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP, Business, broad-based equity grants, 050203 business & management, EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, Management control system, attraction

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9aef1868033ac30e9fd5bd0029fdd6f5
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6ec17393-08cc-4320-96bb-0b6b176220e4

المؤلفون: Daniela Elena Marinescu, Ioana Manafi, Dumitru Marin

المصدر: International Journal of Economic Practices and Theories. 2(3):99-108

مصطلحات موضوعية: Pareto efficiency, adverse selection model, optimal incentive contracts, jel:C61, jel:D82

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::40da2d409eb2f63ffcbe9f97b62f407c
http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents/pdf

المؤلفون: Jan Zabojnik, Anthony M. Marino

المصدر: The RAND Journal of Economics. 39:565-585

مصطلحات موضوعية: Consumption (economics), Finance, Economics and Econometrics, business.industry, media_common.quotation_subject, Corporate governance, Work related, Microeconomics, jel:M5, Incentive, jel:J3, Agency (sociology), Economics, Production (economics), Job Perks, Agency Problems, Optimal Incentive Contracts, business, Autonomy, media_common

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ecbe46c1b59dd559eeea32e1088b0daa
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00028.x

المؤلفون: Jan Zabojnik

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:J33, jel:M52, Stock-based Compensation, Employee Stock Options, Optimal Incentive Contracts, Firm-specific Knowledge, jel:D86, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::f8efd08a30359f27e69f9751884685cd
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1325.pdf

المؤلفون: Marinescu, Daniela Elena, Manafi, Ioana, Marin, Dumitru

المصدر: International Journal of Economic Practices and Theories; Vol. 2 No. 3 (2012); 99-108 ; 2247 – 7225

مصطلحات موضوعية: Pareto efficiency, adverse selection model, optimal incentive contracts, C61, D82

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://www.ijept.eu/index.php/ijept/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Inf/40; http://www.ijept.eu/index.php/ijept/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Inf/pdf; http://www.ijept.eu/index.php/ijept/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Inf

الاتاحة: http://www.ijept.eu/index.php/ijept/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Inf

المؤلفون: Founanou, Mathurin, Ratsimalahelo, Zaka

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:G28, jel:D82, Microfinance institution, adverse selection, moral hazard, regulation, supervision, optimal incentive contracts, jel:G21

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::025960233f80fad9d0a1ffb5c7862d18
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41428/1/MPRA_paper_41428.pdf

المؤلفون: Astrid Zabel, Brian Roe

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:Q20, Optimal Incentive Contracts, Payments for Environmental Services, Performance Incentives, Distortion

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::7058dec40360ff51cfe8566da4bd3092
http://www.ied.ethz.ch/pub/pdf/IED_WP07_Zabel_Roe.pdf

المؤلفون: Martine Quinzii, Michael Magill

مصطلحات موضوعية: Shock (economics), Mathematical optimization, optimal incentive contracts, common shocks, multi agents, monotone likelihood ratio, Statistics, Marginal product, Economics, Value (computer science), jel:D, Function (mathematics), Compensation (engineering)

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e313464ca0902dcf9500bdf1eea5f213
http://wp.econ.ucdavis.edu/05-2.pdf

المؤلفون: W. Bolt

مصطلحات موضوعية: adverse selection, moral hazard, optimal incentive contracts, supervision

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::a82427b158b5d7622ae888466e5c913e
https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/wo0594_tcm46-145914.pdf

المؤلفون: Marinescu, Daniela Elena, Manafi, Ioana, Marin, Dumitru

المصدر: International Journal of Economic Practices and Theories; Vol 2, No 3 (2012); 99-108; 2247 – 7225

مصطلحات الفهرس: Cybernetics;Economics, Pareto efficiency; adverse selection model; optimal incentive contracts, C61, D82, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, Peer-reviewed Article

URL: http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept%20/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents
http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept%20/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents/40
http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept%20/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents/pdf
http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept%20/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents/40
http://www.ijept.org/index.php/ijept%20/article/view/An_Adverse_Selection_Model_with_Finite_Number_of_Types_and_Informational_Rents/pdf