المؤلفون: Greve, Henrich R.

المصدر: Strategic Management Journal, 2008 Mar 01. 29(3), 229-249.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20142015

المؤلفون: Frei, Christoph, Bernard, Benjamin

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C73, Folk theorem, repeated games, continuous time, imperfect observability

Relation: gbv-ppn:893334154; Journal: Theoretical Economics; Volume: 11; Year: 2016; Issue: 2; Pages: 411-453; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150282; RePEc:the:publsh:1687

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150282
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1687

المؤلفون: Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David, Maskin, Eric

المصدر: Econometrica, 1994 Sep 01. 62(5), 997-1039.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951505

المؤلفون: Rudolf Kerschbamer

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2014-03.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: JEL-Classification, C72, D82, D83, L13 Keywords, Value of Information, Value of Commitment, Sequential Move Game, Imperfect Observability, Stackelberg Duopoly, First-Mover Advantage

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.649.8943; http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2014-03.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.649.8943
http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2014-03.pdf

المؤلفون: Taro Kumagai

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/katudou/publication/paper/discussion/0515.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Negligence rule, Imperfect observability, Incentive for care, Punitive damages JEL Classification, D82, K13, K41

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.61.2647; http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/katudou/publication/paper/discussion/0515.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.61.2647
http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/katudou/publication/paper/discussion/0515.pdf

المؤلفون: Werner Güth, Wieland Müller, Yossi Spiegel

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/yossi22.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: commitment, imperfect observability, errors in communication, sequential games, oligopoly, experiments. JEL classi…cation numbers, C72

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.198.4459; http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/yossi22.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.198.4459
http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/yossi22.pdf

المؤلفون: Hörtnagl, Tanja, Kerschbamer, Rudolf

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C72, D82, D83, L13, Value of Information, Value of Commitment, Sequential Move Game, Imperfect Observability, Stackelberg Duopoly, First-Mover Advantage

Relation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics; No. 2014-03; gbv-ppn:777775158; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101088; RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-03

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101088

المؤلفون: Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, Wieland Müller, Andreas Stiehler

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/paperspdf/2003-07.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: commitment, imperfect observability, ultimatum bargaining game, Nash bar- gaining game, experiments

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.12.3883; http://www.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/paperspdf/2003-07.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.12.3883
http://www.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/paperspdf/2003-07.pdf

المؤلفون: Werner Güth A, Müller B, Yossi Spiegel C

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/GEB-2006.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Commitment, Imperfect observability, Errors in communication, Sequential games, Oligopoly, Experiments

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.580.8042; http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/GEB-2006.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.580.8042
http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/GEB-2006.pdf

المؤلفون: Werner Güth, Wieland Müller, Yossi Spiegel

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: ftp://ftp.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/pub/esi/discussionpapers/2002-10.pdf

مصطلحات موضوعية: commitment, imperfect observability, sequential games, oligopoly, experiments. JEL classi…cation numbers, C72

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.18.8917

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.18.8917

المؤلفون: Werner Güthy, Wieland Müllerz, Yossi Spiegelx

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://econ.tau.ac.il/papers/game/yossi10.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: commitment, imperfect observability, sequential games, oligopoly, experiments. JEL classi…cation numbers, C72, C91

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.614.7911; http://econ.tau.ac.il/papers/game/yossi10.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.614.7911
http://econ.tau.ac.il/papers/game/yossi10.pdf

المؤلفون: Tone Dieckmann

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.may.ie/academic/economics/pdf/N720897.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Evolution of Conventions, Mobility, Imperfect Observability JEL classi cation, C72, D82

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.201.7621; http://www.may.ie/academic/economics/pdf/N720897.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.201.7621
http://www.may.ie/academic/economics/pdf/N720897.pdf

المؤلفون: Ghachem, Montasser

المصدر: Journal of Theoretical Biology. 396:182-190

مصطلحات موضوعية: Evolution of cooperation, Prisoners' Dilemma, Evolutionary stability, Non-uniform interaction rates, Institutions, Institutional screening, Imperfect observability, Economics, nationalekonomi

وصف الملف: print

URL الوصول: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-131204

المؤلفون: Heifetz, Aviad, Spiegel, Yossi

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, dispositions, evolution of preferences, selection dynamics, perception biases, interdependent preferences, imperfect observability

Relation: Series: Discussion Paper; No. 1304; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221659; RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1304

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221659

المؤلفون: Sonntag, Axel, Zizzo, Daniel John

مصطلحات موضوعية: Imperfect observability, Information acquisition, Lab and online experiment, Team production, 1407 Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, 2002 Economics and Econometrics

Relation: orcid:0000-0003-4830-4364; ES/K002201/1

الاتاحة: https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:afc81d9/UQafc81d9_OA.pdf
https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:afc81d9

المؤلفون: Güth, Werner, Kirchsteiger, Georg, Ritzberger, Klaus

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, C72, commitments, imperfect observability, subgame perfection

Relation: Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series; No. 35; gbv-ppn:735469598; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68642; RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:35

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68642

المؤلفون: Aviad Heifetz, Yossi Spiegel, Chris Shannon

المصدر: Economic Theory. 32:251-286

مصطلحات موضوعية: Microeconomics, Interdependence, Economics and Econometrics, Class (computer programming), media_common.quotation_subject, Evolutionary stability, Economics, Asymptotic distribution, dispositions, evolution of preferences, selection dynamics, perception biases, interdependent preferences, imperfect observability, Mathematical economics, media_common, Overconfidence effect

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2c72e0743c1ee3f55d003e82d59c9ae0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7

المؤلفون: Tanja Hörtnagl, Rudolf Kerschbamer

مصطلحات موضوعية: Value of Information, Value of Commitment, Sequential Move Game, Imperfect Observability, Stackelberg Duopoly, First-Mover Advantage, jel:C72, jel:D82, jel:L13, ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING, jel:D83

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::a685b680ddfddcb27dce8ab832be05e5
https://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2014-03.pdf

المؤلفون: Chengsi Wang, Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Benoit Julien

مصطلحات موضوعية: TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS, Informative advertising, jel:D83, costly advertising, directed search, imperfect observability, sales mechanism, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Advertising, jel:E52, jel:E63, jel:J64, Measure (mathematics), jel:M37, Economics, ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::61eda5566d25c7133e3864cbe13e8fce
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38057/1/MPRA_paper_38057.pdf

المؤلفون: Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon, Yossi Spiegel

مصطلحات موضوعية: dispositions, evolution of preferences, genericity, selection dynamics, imperfect observability

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::0ece6f5eb0db9602c4f84bf1556a0d68
http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/papers/what36c.pdf