المؤلفون: Everhardt, R.J., Schoonbeek, Lambert

المصدر: Everhardt , R J & Schoonbeek , L 2015 , ' Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information ' , Decisions in Economics and Finance , vol. 38 , no. 1 , pp. 55-73 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-014-0158-1

مصطلحات موضوعية: Rent seeking, Group contest, Private information, Group-size paradox

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/899d278b-1ae3-4286-95fe-fa1d8d9de2c2

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/11370/899d278b-1ae3-4286-95fe-fa1d8d9de2c2
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/899d278b-1ae3-4286-95fe-fa1d8d9de2c2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-014-0158-1
https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/98862463/Rent_seeking_group_contests_with_one_sided_private_information.pdf

المؤلفون: 羅祐辰, Lo, You-Chen

المساهمون: 潘振宇 陳鎮洲, Pan, Chen-Yu Chen, Jenn-Jou

مصطلحات موضوعية: 團隊競賽, 最適報酬分配, 均分規則, 績效規則, 組別大小悖論, 團隊公共財, Group contests, Optimal prize sharing rule, Egalitarian rule, Meritocratic rules, Group size paradox, Group public goods

وصف الملف: 1052377 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: Baik, K. H. (1993): “Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case,” Economics Letters, 41(4), 363–367. --- (2008): “Contests with group-specific public-good prizes,” Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 103–117. Baik, K. H., and S. Lee (1997): “Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes,” European Journal of Political Economy, 13(1), 121–130. --- (2007): “Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information,” European Journal of Political Economy, 23(3), 768–776. Balart, P., S. Flamand, O. Gürtler, and O. Troumpounis (2018): “Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20(5), 703–724. Balart, P., S. Flamand, and O. Troumpounis (2015): “Prize-sharing rules in collective rent seeking,” Companion to political economy of rent seeking, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 92–112. --- (2016): “Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 46, 239–262. Bloch, F. (2012): “Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts,” in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, ed. by R. Garfinkel, and S. Skaperdas. Oxford University Press, New York. Chamberlin, J. (1974): “Provision of collective goods as a function of group size,” American Political Science Review, 68(2), 707–716. Cornes, R., and R. Hartley (2005): “Asymmetric contests with general technologies,” Economic theory, 26, 923–946. Esteban, J., and D. Ray (2001): “Collective action and the group size paradox,” American Political Science Review, 95(3), 663–672. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1991): Game theory. MIT Press. Gupta, D. (2023): “Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?,” Review of Economic Design, 27(1), 221–244.33 Kobayashi, K., and H. Konishi (2021): “Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 56(2), 205–221. Kolmar, M., and H. Rommeswinkel (2013): “Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 89, 9–22. Lee, S. (1995): “Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking,” Public Choice, 85(1-2), 31–44. McGuire, M. (1974): “Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under Cournot behavior,” Public Choice, pp. 107–126. Nitzan, S. (1991): “Collective rent dissipation,” The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1522–1534. Nitzan, S., and K. Ueda (2009): “Collective contests for commons and club goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 48–55. --- (2011): “Prize sharing in collective contests,” European Economic Review, 55(5), 678–687. --- (2014): “Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 43, 219–238. Olson, M. (1965): “The logic of collective action,” Cambridge, MA (USA) Harvard Univ. Press. Ryvkin, D. (2011): “The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups,” Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 564–572. Trevisan, F. (2020): “Optimal prize allocations in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 55, 431–451. Tullock, G. (1980): “Efficient rent seeking,” in Efficient rent-seeking: Chronicle of an intellectual quagmire, pp. 3–16. Springer. Ueda, K. (2002): “Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking,” Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 613–626.; G0112258002; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/154230; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/154230/1/800201.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/154230
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/154230/1/800201.pdf

المؤلفون: Qinggong Wu, Kfir Eliaz

المصدر: Eliaz, K & Wu, Q 2018, ' A simple model of competition between teams ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 176, pp. 372-392 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

مصطلحات موضوعية: Group size paradox, Economics and Econometrics, Concave function, Team contests, Computer science, RENT-SEEKING, 05 social sciences, Public good, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, CONTEST, Competition (economics), Microeconomics, EQUILIBRIUM, Simple (abstract algebra), Complete information, GOODS, 0502 economics and business, Value (economics), COLLECTIVE CONTESTS, PUBLIC-GOOD PRIZES, 050207 economics, ALL-PAY AUCTIONS, CONFLICT, 050205 econometrics

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8c786c13cfa47f9ee29b0ab6a572e2c4
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

المؤلفون: Liang, Che-Yuan

المصدر: Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online).

مصطلحات موضوعية: lobbying, rent-seeking, collective action problem, group size paradox, local governments, intergovernmental grants, regression-discontinuity, Economics, Nationalekonomi

وصف الملف: electronic

URL الوصول: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-15506
https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:43277/FULLTEXT01.pdf

المؤلفون: Wei Hu, Nicolas Treich, Jel Codes D, We Thank Ingela Alger, Guillaume Cheikbossian, Charles Figuières, Karine Van, Der Straeten, We Eaere

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/treich/CC.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: Cooperation, Group Rent-Seeking, Conflict, Group Size Paradox, Altruism

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.411.4402; http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/treich/CC.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.411.4402
http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/treich/CC.pdf

المؤلفون: Kolmar, Martin, Rommeswinkel, Hendrik

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, D74, H41, contests, public goods, group-size paradox, Interessenvertretung, Soziale Gruppe, Wettbewerb, Öffentliches Gut, Rent Seeking, Theorie

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 3362; gbv-ppn:659489015; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335

المؤلفون: Cheikbossian, Guillaume, Fayat, Romain

المساهمون: Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), CREM. Centre de recherche en économie & management

المصدر: International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources ; https://hal.science/hal-02156268 ; International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources, CREM. Centre de recherche en économie & management, Jun 2018, Rennes, France

مصطلحات موضوعية: group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

جغرافية الموضوع: Rennes, France

Relation: hal-02156268; https://hal.science/hal-02156268

الاتاحة: https://hal.science/hal-02156268

المؤلفون: Nitzan, Shmuel, Ueda, Kaoru

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, collective contest, mixed public-good prize, endogenous sharing rules, the group-size paradox, Gruppenarbeit, Extensives Spiel, Erfolgsbeteiligung, Öffentliches Gut, Ökonomischer Anreiz, Theorie

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 3212; gbv-ppn:639527639; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46386

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46386

المؤلفون: Kolmar, Martin, Wagener, Andreas

مصطلحات موضوعية: ddc:330, Z13, D72, N40, D74, conflict, incentives, group-size paradox, Gruppenarbeit, Wettbewerb, Arbeitsorganisation, Betrieblicher Konflikt, Trittbrettfahrerverhalten, Leistungsanreiz, Wirtschaftliche Effizienz, Theorie

Relation: Series: CESifo Working Paper; No. 3157; gbv-ppn:634266233; http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850

المؤلفون: Luke Boosey, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin

مصطلحات موضوعية: Mathematical economics, Microeconomic theory, Group contest, Group size paradox, Population uncertainty, Relative group impact, Stochastic group size

Relation: 10779/rmit.27574236.v1; https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Contests_between_groups_of_unknown_size/27574236

الاتاحة: https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Contests_between_groups_of_unknown_size/27574236

المؤلفون: Eliaz, Kfir, Wu, Qinggong

المصدر: Eliaz , K & Wu , Q 2018 , ' A simple model of competition between teams ' , Journal of Economic Theory , vol. 176 , pp. 372-392 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006

مصطلحات موضوعية: ALL-PAY AUCTIONS, COLLECTIVE CONTESTS, CONFLICT, EQUILIBRIUM, GOODS, Group size paradox, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, PUBLIC-GOOD PRIZES, RENT-SEEKING, Team contests, eco, psy

Relation: https://pure.au.dk/portal/da/publications/a-simple-model-of-competition-between-teams(782909dd-15d0-4f1c-99ee-df1e315860c3).html

الاتاحة: https://pure.au.dk/portal/da/publications/a-simple-model-of-competition-between-teams(782909dd-15d0-4f1c-99ee-df1e315860c3).html

المؤلفون: Romain Fayat, Guillaume Cheikbossian

المساهمون: Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université de Montpellier (UM), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), CREM. Centre de recherche en économie & management, Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)

المصدر: Economics Letters
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2018, 168, pp.77-81. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011⟩
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2018, 168, pp.77-81
International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources, CREM. Centre de recherche en économie & management, Jun 2018, Rennes, France

مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics and Econometrics, Group size paradox, (Impure) Public good, 05 social sciences, Complementarity, Collective action, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Complementarity (physics), Microeconomics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions, Group contest, 0502 economics and business, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption, Economics, 050206 economic theory, 050207 economics, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, Rivalry, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Finance

وصف الملف: text

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::de7ed26e2fc8efc6f77870d40ef85d3c
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02624005

المؤلفون: Shmuel Nitzan, Kaoru Ueda

المصدر: European Economic Review. 55:678-687

مصطلحات موضوعية: Collective contest, mixed public-good prize, endogenous sharing rules, the group-size paradox, Microeconomics, Marginal cost, jel:D70, Economics and Econometrics, Incentive, Group (mathematics), jel:D71, jel:D72, Economics, CONTEST, Finance

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::eccf4081cab4d34771ff99f5d614b848
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.09.005

المؤلفون: Sabine Flamand, Pau Balart, Orestis Troumpounis

مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics and Econometrics, Group (mathematics), D23, D71, D72, H41, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), 05 social sciences, Strategic Choice, CONTEST, Microeconomics, Competition (economics), Phenomenon, 0502 economics and business, collective rent seeking, strategic choice of sharing rules, group size paradox, monopolization, Economics, International political economy, 050206 economic theory, 050207 economics, Monopolization, Public finance

وصف الملف: application/pdf

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9dfbc49096e9ce0d311084aa455d72e4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6

المؤلفون: Lambert Schoonbeek, Rob J. Everhardt

المساهمون: Research programme EEF

المصدر: Decisions in Economics and Finance, 38(1), 55-73

مصطلحات موضوعية: Public economics, Group (mathematics), media_common.quotation_subject, Group-size paradox, CONTEST, Microeconomics, Group contest, One sided, Complete information, Value (economics), Economics, Private information, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Rent-seeking, Private information retrieval, Finance, Rent seeking, Public finance, media_common

وصف الملف: application/pdf

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::60a8ceb50e4b4161975a89b20256d243
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/899d278b-1ae3-4286-95fe-fa1d8d9de2c2

المؤلفون: Martin Kolmar, Hendrik Rommeswinkel

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:D74, contests, public goods, group-size paradox, jel:H41

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d98723942c4399128e425b5989d60c58
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1775784

المؤلفون: Martin Kolmar, Andreas Wagener

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:Z13, jel:N40, jel:D74, jel:D72, conflict, incentives, group-size paradox

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::23e5116dca69c205551bcc2a01ed9913
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3157.pdf

المؤلفون: Liang, Che-Yuan

المصدر: SSRN Electronic Journal.

مصطلحات موضوعية: jel:D73, jel:D72, jel:H73, jel:D78, jel:H71, jel:H72, lobbying, rent-seeking, collective action problem, group size paradox, local governments, intergovernmental grants, regression-discontinuity, jel:H77

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cc56fcc00712160fab41243d6e3845f9
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1094970

المؤلفون: Shmuel Nitzan, Kaoru Ueda

المساهمون: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives

المصدر: http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~ida/3Kenkyuu/4ouyoumicro/2007ouyoumicro/080318ueda.pdf.

مصطلحات موضوعية: collective contest, commons and club good prize, the group-size paradox, excessive or inadequate winning group size

وصف الملف: application/pdf

Relation: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.331.5048; http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~ida/3Kenkyuu/4ouyoumicro/2007ouyoumicro/080318ueda.pdf

الاتاحة: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.331.5048
http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~ida/3Kenkyuu/4ouyoumicro/2007ouyoumicro/080318ueda.pdf