المؤلفون: 張家瑜, Chang, Chia-Yu

المساهمون: 張元晨, Chang, Yuan-Chen

مصطلحات موضوعية: non-GAAP盈餘調整, 高階經理人獎酬, 盈餘管理, non-GAAP adjustment, executive compensation, earning management

وصف الملف: 1589413 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: Aboody, D., Barth, M. E., & Kasznik, R. (2006). Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123? Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 429-461. Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of accounting and economics, 29(1), 73-100. Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., Lang, M., & Williams, C. (2012). Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable? Journal of accounting and economics, 54(1), 68-93. Bentley, J. W., Christensen, T. E., Gee, K. H., & Whipple, B. C. (2018). Disentangling managers’ and analysts’ non‐GAAP reporting. Journal of accounting research, 56(4), 1039-1081. Bhattacharya, N., Black, E. L., Christensen, T. E., & Larson, C. R. (2003). Assessing the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. Journal of accounting and economics, 36(1-3), 285-319. Black, D. E., Christensen, T. E., Ciesielski, J. T., & Whipple, B. C. (2021). Non‐GAAP earnings: a consistency and comparability crisis? Contemporary Accounting Research, 38(3), 1712-1747. Black, E. L., Christensen, T. E., Kiosse, P. V., & Steffen, T. D. (2017). Has the regulation of non-GAAP disclosures influenced managers’ use of aggressive earnings exclusions? Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 32(2), 209-240. Bradshaw, M. T., & Sloan, R. G. (2002). GAAP versus the street: An empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of accounting research, 40(1), 41-66. Brosnan, M., Duncan, K., Hasso, T., & Hollindale, J. (2024). Happy 20-year anniversary non-GAAP earnings: a systematic review of the literature. Journal of Accounting Literature, 46(1), 82-104. Brown, L. D., & Sivakumar, K. (2003). Comparing the value relevance of two operating income measures. Review of Accounting Studies, 8, 561-572. Campbell, J. L., Hansen, J., Simon, C. A., & Smith, J. L. (2015). Audit committee stock options and financial reporting quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 34(2), 91-120. Curtis, A., Li, V., & Patrick, P. H. (2021). The use of adjusted earnings in performance evaluation. Review of Accounting Studies, 1-33. Curtis, A. B., McVay, S. E., & Whipple, B. C. (2014). The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in the presence of transitory gains. The Accounting Review, 89(3), 933-958. Ferri, F., & Li, N. (2020). Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(1), 291-329. Guest, N. M., Kothari, S., & Pozen, R. C. (2022). Why do large positive non-GAAP earnings adjustments predict abnormally high CEO pay? The Accounting Review, 97(6), 297-326. Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998). Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 653-691. Hayes, R. M., Lemmon, M., & Qiu, M. (2012). Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of financial economics, 105(1), 174-190. Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 153-161. Holmstrom, B. (1983). Equilibrium long-term labor contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 23-54. Isidro, H., & Marques, A. (2013). The effects of compensation and board quality on non-GAAP disclosures in Europe. The International Journal of Accounting, 48(3), 289-317. Keller, W., & Olney, W. W. (2021). Globalization and executive compensation. Journal of International Economics, 129, 103408. Laurion, H. (2020). Implications of Non-GAAP earnings for real activities and accounting choices. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 70(1), 101333. Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell journal of economics, 55-73.; G0111357008; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/152720; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/152720/1/700801.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/152720
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/152720/1/700801.pdf

المؤلفون: 彭容緯, Peng, Rong-Wei

المساهمون: 潘健民, Pan, Chien-Min

مصطلحات موضوعية: 星座, 高階經理人, 管理階層盈餘預測, 盈餘預測修正, Zodiac, Top manager, Management earnings forecasts, Earnings forecasts revisions

Relation: 1111人力銀行，2017，企業人資不告訴你的秘密，網址： https://www.1111.com.tw/news/jobns/103663，搜尋日期：2024年5月15日。 中華徵信所，1993，台灣地區專業經理人名錄，臺北：著者。 Ajinkya, B. B., and M. J. Gift. 1984. Corporate managers' earnings forecasts and symmetrical adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (2): 425-444. Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 343-376. Baginski, S. P., J. M. Hassell, and M. D. Kimbrough. 2002. The effect of legal environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in U.S. and Canadian markets. The Accounting Review 77 (1): 25-50. Baginski, S. P., J. M. Hassell, and M. D. Kimbrough. 2004. Why do managers explain their earnings forecasts?. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (1): 1-29. Baik, B., D. B. Farber, and S. S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645-1668. Bamber, L. S., and Y. S. Cheon. 1998. Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 167-190. Bamber, L. S., J. X. Jiang, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. What's my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162. Becker, J., J. Medjedovic, and C. Merkle. 2019. The effect of CEO extraversion on analyst forecasts: Stereotypes and similarity bias. Financial Review 54 (1): 133-164. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208. Brous, P. A., and O. Kini. 1994. The valuation effects of equity issues and the level of institutional ownership: Evidence from analysts' earnings forecasts. Financial Management 23 (1): 33-46. Calori, R., G. Johnson, and P. Sarnin. 1994. CEOs' cognitive maps and the scope of the organization. Strategic Management Journal 15 (6): 437-457. Capalbo, F., A. Frino, M. Y. Lim, V. Mollica, and R. Palumbo. 2018. The impact of CEO narcissism on earnings management. ABACUS 54 (2): 210-226. Carpenter, M. A., M. A. Geletkanycz, and W. G. Sanders. 2004. Upper echelons research revisited: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition. Journal of Management 30 (6): 749-778. Cheng, E. C. M., and S. M. Courtenay. 2006. Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting 41 (3): 262-289. Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176. Cheng, Q., and T. D. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The Accounting Review 80 (2): 441-476. Cho, M., Y. D. Hah, and O. Kim. 2011. Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses. The International Journal of Accounting 46 (1): 79-101. Clarke, D., T. Gabriels, and J. Barnes. 1996. Astrological signs as determinants of extroversion and emotionality: An empirical study. The Journal of Psychology 130 (2): 131-140. Coller, M., and T. L. Yohn. 1997. Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of Accounting Research 35 (2): 181-191. Collins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2-3): 143-181. Diamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-1359. Dorantes, C. A., C. Li, G. F. Peters, and V. J. Richardson. 2013. The effect of enterprise systems implementation on the firm information environment. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (4): 1427-1461. Duchin, R., J. G. Matsusaka, and O. Ozbas. 2010. When are outside directors effective?. Journal of Financial Economics 96 (2): 195-214. Eng, L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (4): 325-345. Feng, M., C. Li, and S. McVay. 2009. Internal control and management guidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2-3): 190-209. Francis, J. R., I. K. Khurana, and R. Pereira. 2005. Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1125-1162. Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141-1179. Ge, W., and S. McVay. 2005. The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 19 (3): 137-158. Goodman, T. H., M. Neamtiu, N. Shroff, and H. D. White. 2014. Management forecast quality and capital investment decisions. The Accounting Review 89 (1): 331-365. Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and M. Puri. 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (1): 103-121. Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review 32(2): 334-343. Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193-206. Herrmann, D., T. Inoue, and W. B. Thomas. 2003. The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1): 89-108. Higgins, H. N. 2013. Do stock-for-stock merger acquirers manage earnings? Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (1): 44-70. Hitt, M. A., and B. B. Tyler. 1991. Strategic decision models: Integrating different perspectives. Strategic Management Journal 12 (5): 327-351. Hossain, M., M. H. B. Perera, and A. R. Rahman. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 6 (1): 69-87. Hribar, P. and H. Yang. 2016. CEO overconfidence and management forecasting. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 204-227. Hume, N., and G. Goldstein. 1977. Is there an association between astrological data and personality?. Journal of Clinical Psychology 33 (3): 711-713. Hutton, A. P., G. S. Miller, and D. J. Skinner. 2003. The role of supplementary statements with management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (5): 867-890. Hutton, A. P., and P. C. Stocken. 2021. Prior forecasting accuracy and investor reaction to management earnings forecasts. Journal of Financial Reporting 6 (1): 87-107. Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329. Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. 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Financial astrology and behavioral bias: Evidence from India. Asia-Pacific Financial Markets 28 (1): 3-17. Mayo, J. 1964. Teach Yourself Astrology. London, UK: English University Press. Mitchell, V. W. 1995. Using astrology in market segmentation. Management Decision 33 (1): 48-57. Nagar, V., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 283-309. Nagata, K., and P. Nguyen. 2017. Ownership structure and disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts revisions in Japan. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 36 (6): 451-467. Narayana, M. 2021. Moon Signs: Unlock Your Inner Luminary Power. London, UK: Hardie Grant. Ota, L. 2010. The Value Relevance of Management Forecasts and Their Impact on Analysts’ Forecasts: Empirical Evidence from Japan. ABACUS 46 (1): 28-59. Penman, S. H. 1980. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 18 (1): 132-160. Priem, R. L., D. W. Lyon, and G. G. Dess. 1999. Inherent limitations of demographic proxies in top management team heterogeneity research. Journal of Management 25 (6): 935-953. Rogers, J. L., and P. C. Stocken. 2005. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting Review 80 (4): 1233-1260. Saklofske, D. H., I. W. Kelly, and D. W. McKerracher. 1982. An empirical study of personality and astrological factors. The Journal of Psychology 110 (2): 275-280. Smith, Jr. C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (3): 263-292. Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71. Tsang, A., F. Xie, and X. Xin. 2019. Foreign institutional investors and corporate voluntary disclosure around the world. The Accounting Review 94 (5): 319-348. Wallace, R. S. O., and K. Naser. 1995. Firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 14 (4): 311-368. Wang, M., and K. Hussainey. 2013. Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 32 (3): 26-49. Wang, G., R. M. Holmes Jr, I. S. Oh, and W. Zhu. 2016. Do CEOs matter to firm strategic actions and firm performance? A meta‐analytic investigation based on upper echelons theory. Personnel Psychology 69 (4): 775-862. Waymire, G. 1986. Additional evidence on the accuracy of analyst forecasts before and after voluntary management earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review 61 (1): 129-142.; G0111353012; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/152482

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/152482

المؤلفون: 潘虹華, Pan, Hung-Hua, 廖懿屏, Liao, Yi-Ping, 鍾旻純, Chung, Min-Chun

المساهمون: 會計評論

مصطلحات موضوعية: 薪酬委員會, 高階經理人薪酬, 相對績效評估, Compensation committee, Executive compensation, Relative performance evaluation

وصف الملف: 471157 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: 會計評論, 68, pp.119-159; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/122836; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/122836/1/134.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/122836
https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201901_(68).0004
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/122836/1/134.pdf

المؤلفون: 黃政仁, Huang, Cheng-Jen, 林祐民

المساهمون: 會計系

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人權力, 創新績效, 結構方程模式, 經營績效, 薪酬差距, top management power, innovation performance, structural equation modeling, operating performance, compensation gap

وصف الملف: 220478 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: 產業與管理論壇, Vol.20, No.4, pp.24-57; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/125154; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/125154/1/51.pdf

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/125154
https://doi.org/10.3966/199582342018122004002
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/125154/1/51.pdf

المؤلفون: 許慧雯, Hsu, Hui-Wen, 蔡柳卿, Tsai, Liu-Ching

المساهمون: 會計評論

مصطلحات موضوعية: Restructuring charges, Restructuring charge reversals, CEO compensation, Compensation committee effectiveness, 重組支出, 重組支出迴轉, 高階經理人薪酬, 薪酬委員會有效性

وصف الملف: 605894 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: 會計評論, 67, pp.1-40; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/122829; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/122829/1/127.pdf

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/122829
https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201807_(67).0001
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/122829/1/127.pdf

المؤلفون: 陳嬿如, Chen, Yenn-Ru

المساهمون: 財管系

مصطلحات موضوعية: Gender Impact, Risk Taking, Executive Compensation, 女性決策者, 風險性投資, 高階經理人薪酬

وصف الملف: 116 bytes; text/html

Relation: 科技部, MOST107-2629-H004-001, 10708 ~ 10807; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140166; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140166/1/index.html

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140166
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140166/1/index.html

المؤلفون: 黃振豊, 陳薇如, 張雅婷

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人薪酬, 核心代理問題, 薪酬績效敏感度, 盈餘績效, 股價績效, CEO Compensation, Core Agency Problems, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Earnings Performance, Stock Return Performance

وصف الملف: 107 bytes; text/html

Relation: 管理學報 33(2)，頁 213-238; 全文連結 http://dx.doi.org/10.6504%2fJOM.2016.33.02.05; https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/110002; https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/bitstream/987654321/110002/1/index.html; https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/bitstream/987654321/110002/-1/核心代理問題之道德風險對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響.pdf

الاتاحة: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/110002
https://doi.org/10.6504/JOM.2016.33.02.05
https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/bitstream/987654321/110002/1/index.html
https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/bitstream/987654321/110002/-1/核心代理問題之道德風險對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響.pdf

المؤلفون: 詹詠晴, Chan, Yung-Chin

المساهمون: 李佳玲, Lee, Chia-Ling

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人, 薪酬差距, 公司績效, 創新, Top Manager, Compensation Gap, Corporate Performance, Innovation

وصف الملف: 872848 bytes; application/pdf

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Optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices. Journal of Finance 37: 275-287.\nDolliger, M. J. 1998. Entrepreneurship: Strategies and Resources. 4th ed. Illinois. Sheridan Books.\nEriksson, T. 1999. Executive compensation and tournament theory: empirical tests on Danish data. Journal of Labor Economics 17: 262-280.\nEisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency-theory and institutional-theory explanations: the case of retail sales compensation. Academy of Management Review 14: 57-74.\nFinkelstein, S., and Boyd, B. K. 1998. How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41: 179-199.\nFinkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9 (6): 543-558.\nFinkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation: a study of the intersection of markets and political processes. 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الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140984
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202200803
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140984/1/302101.pdf

المؤلفون: 彭惠瑜, Peng, Hui-Yu

المساهمون: 黃政仁, Huang, Cheng-Jen

مصطلحات موضوعية: 家族企業, 高階經理人, 激勵性薪酬, 創新績效, Family firms, Top managers, Incentive compensation, Innovation performance

وصف الملف: 1312321 bytes; application/pdf

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الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140574
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202200621
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140574/1/301901.pdf

المؤلفون: 李婉綺, Lee, Wan-Chi

المساهمون: 潘健民

مصطلحات موضوعية: 投資效率, 高階經理人, 星座, Investment efficiency, Top managers, Zodiac

وصف الملف: 1299327 bytes; application/pdf

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Does earnings management affect firms` investment decisions? Accounting Review 83 (6): 1571-1603.\nNakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk-taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.\nPitcher, P., S. Chreim, and V. Kisfalvi. 2000. CEO succession research: Methodological bridges over troubled waters. Strategic Management Journal 21 (6): 625-648.\nPriem, R. L., D. W. Lyon, and G. G. Dess. 1999. Inherent limitations of demographic proxies in top management team heterogeneity research. Journal of Management 25 (6): 935-953.\nRajkovic, T. 2020. Lead independent directors and investment efficiency. Journal of Corporate Finance 64: 101690.\nSaklofske, D. H., I. W. Kelly, and D. W. McKerracher 1982. An empirical study of personality and astrological factors. Journal of Psychology 110 (2): 275-280.\nSanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055-1078.\nStiglitz, J. E., and A. Weiss. 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review 71 (3): 393-410.\nYoshikawa, H. 1980. On the “Q” theory of investment. American Economic Review 70 (4): 739-743.; G0109353008; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140570; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140570/1/300801.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/140570
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202200595
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/140570/1/300801.pdf

المؤلفون: 高孟君, 劉家君, 蕭佩宜, 陳睿筠, 陳依婷, 田岢玟

المساهمون: 元培科技大學醫事科技學院

مصطلحات موضوعية: 董監事薪酬、高階經理人薪酬、金融控股公司、隨機邊界法

Relation: http://120.106.195.12/handle/310904600Q/6994

الاتاحة: http://120.106.195.12/handle/310904600Q/6994

المؤلفون: 林岳喬, 祝懿箴

مصطلحات موضوعية: 生命週期, 高階經理人薪酬, Vega effect

Relation: 2009台灣科技大學管理新思維學術研討會、台灣科技大學，台灣(2009); http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/handle/987654321/13703; http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/13703/1/The Effect of Firm Life Cycle1.doc; http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/13703/2/The Effect of Firm Life Cycle2.pdf

الاتاحة: http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/handle/987654321/13703
http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/13703/1/The Effect of Firm Life Cycle1.doc
http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/13703/2/The Effect of Firm Life Cycle2.pdf

المؤلفون: 方崇雄, 康雅菁, 陳冠利, 魏鸞瑩

المساهمون: 勞工系

مصطلحات موضوعية: 職能分析, 高階經理人, 數位遊戲產業

وصف الملف: 262 bytes; text/html

Relation: 中華管理評論 13:2 2010.05[民99.05] 頁(9)0-(9)20; http://ir.lib.pccu.edu.tw//handle/987654321/49926; http://ir.lib.pccu.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/49926/2/index.html

الاتاحة: http://ir.lib.pccu.edu.tw//handle/987654321/49926
http://ir.lib.pccu.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/49926/2/index.html

المؤلفون: 謝旻軒, Hsieh, Min-Hsuan

المساهمون: 徐愛恩, Tsui, Ai-An

مصطلحات موضوعية: 債務資金成本, 高階經理人薪酬, 經理人持股比例, 公司治理機制, Cost of debt, Executive compensation, Managerial ownership, Corporate governance mechanisms

وصف الملف: 1626901 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: 中文部分：\n李怡璇，(2013)。董監事酬勞與董監事責任險對於負債資金成本之影響，國立彰化師範大學會計學系碩士論文。\n陳瑞斌、翁慈青、朱全斌，（2009）。揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響，財務金融學刊，第17卷第2期，71-110。\n楊東曉、蘇秋竹，（2012）。經理人股權相關薪酬對違約風險的影響。會計評論，54，77-115。\n葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，（2002）。公司治理與平等系統，臺北：商周文化。\n \n英文部分：\nBanker, R. D., Lee, S. Y., Potter, G., Srinivasan, D. (2000). An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3),315-350.\nBebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., & Walker, D. I. (2002). Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 751-846.\nBerle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932).” The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Macmillan, New York, N.Y.\nCallahan, C. M., Vendrzyk, V. P., & Butler, M. G. (2012). The impact of implied facilities cost of money subsidies on capital expenditures and the cost of debt in the defense industry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(3), 301-319.\nColes, J., Daniel, N. & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of Financial Economics,79, 431-468.\nDuru, A., Mansi, S. & Reeb, D. (2005). Earnings-based bonus plans and the agency cost of debt, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24, 431-447.\nFama, E. (1978). The Effects of a Firm`s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders. The American Economic Review, 68(3), 272-284.\nFrancis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, & K. Schipper. (2004). Costs of equity and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 967-1010.\nHaugen, R., & Senbet, L. (1988). Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 23(1), 27-38. doi:10.2307/2331022\nHolmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), 74-91.\nHoskisson, R. E, M.A. Hitt, & C. W. L. Hill. (1993). Managerial Incentitives And Investment In R&D in Large Multi-Product Firms, Organization Science, 4(2), 325-329.\nJensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.\nJensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 1, 5-50.\nJohn, T. & John, W., (1993). Top-management compensation and capital structure, Journal of Finance, 48, 949-974.\nJohn, K., Lynch, A., & Puri, M. (2003). Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield. The Journal of Business, 76(3), 371-409. doi:10.1086/375252\nKelly, K., & J. L. Seow. (2016). Investor Reactions to Company Disclosure of High CEO Pay and High CEO-to-Employee Pay Ratio: An Experimental Investigation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 28 (January), 107-125.\nPittman, J., & S. Fortin. (2004). Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly public firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 (1), 113-136.\nLim, Y. (2011). Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(2), 456-470.\nMiller, E. (1977). Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. The Journal of Finance, 32(4), 1151-1168. doi:10.2307/2326520\nModigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.\nMyers, S.C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(June), 187-221\nSanders, W., & Hambrick, D. (2007). Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078. doi:10.2307/20159913\nSengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review, 73(4), 459-474.\nShuto, A., & Kitagawa, N. (2011). The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 26(3), 590–620. doi:10.1177/0148558X11401553\nVallascas, F., & Hagendorff, J. (2013). CEO bonus remuneration and bank default risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 22(2), 47-89.; G0108353111; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/136311; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/136311/1/311101.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/136311
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202100746
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/136311/1/311101.pdf

المؤلفون: 許云嘉, Hsu, Yun-Chia

المساهمون: 黃政仁, Huang, Cheng-Jen

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人, 國際化社會網絡, 國際化程度, 創新績效, 臺灣電子業, Top managers, Internationalized social network, Internationalization, Innovation performance, Taiwan’s electronics industry

وصف الملف: 2096224 bytes; application/pdf

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Forsgren, and U. Holm. 2002. The strategic impact of external networks: Subsidiary performance and competence development in the multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal 23 (11):979-996.\nBarney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management 17 (1):99-120.\nBaron, R. M., and D. A. Kenny. 1986. The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6):1173-1182.\nBonacich, P. 1987. Power and centrality: A family of measures. American Journal of Sociology 92 (5):1170-1182.\nBorgatti, S. P., and D. S. Halgin. 2011. On network theory. Organization Science 22 (5):1168-1181.\nBurt, R. S. 1992. Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Harvard University Press.\nBurt, R. S. 1997. The contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (2):339-365.\nBurt, R. S. 2000. 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Strategic human resource practices, top management team social networks, and firm performance: The role of human resource practices in creating organizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Journal 46 (6):740-751.\nConnor, T. 2002. The resource-based view of strategy and its value to practising managers. Strategic Change 11 (6):307-316.\nDuernecker, G., and F. Vega-Redondo. 2018. Social networks and the process of globalization. The Review of Economic Studies 85 (3):1716-1751.\nDyer, J. H., and K. Nobeoka. 2000. Creating and managing a high-performance knowledge-sharing network: The Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal 21 (3):345-367.\nEllis, P. D. 2011. Social ties and international entrepreneurship: Opportunities and constraints affecting firm internationalization. Journal of international Business Studies 42 (1):99-127.\nEriksson, K., J. Johanson, A. Majkgård, and D. D. Sharma. 2015. Experiential knowledge and cost in the internationalization process. Knowledge, Networks and Power :41-63.\nFinkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1990. Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (3):484-503.\nFreeman, L. C. 1978. Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social Networks 1 (3):215-239.\nGilsing, V., B. Nooteboom, W. Vanhaverbeke, G. Duysters, and A. van den Oord. 2008. Network embeddedness and the exploration of novel technologies: Technological distance, betweenness centrality and density. Research Policy 37 (10):1717-1731.\nGnyawali, D. R., and R. Madhavan. 2001. Cooperative networks and competitive dynamics: A structural embeddedness perspective. Academy of Management Review 26 (3):431-445.\nGomez-Mejia, L. R., C. Cruz, P. Berrone, and J. De Castro. 2011. The bind that ties: Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms. Academy of Management Annals 5 (1):653-707.\nGorodnichenko, Y., J. Svejnar, and K. Terrell. 2010. Globalization and innovation in emerging markets. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (2):194-226.\nGranovetter, M. S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78 (6):1360-1380.\nGrant, R. M. 1991. The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications for strategy formulation. California Management Review 33 (3):114-135.\nHambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. The Academy of Management Review 9 (2):193-206.\nHansen,M. T. 1999. The search-transfer problem: The role of weak ties in sharing knowledge across organization subunits. Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1):82-111.\nHassel, A., M. Höpner, A. Kurdelbusch, B. Rehder, and R. Zugehör. 2003. Two dimensions of the internationalization of firms. Journal of Management Studies 40 (3):705-723.\nHayes, A. F. 2009. Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new millennium. Communication monographs 76 (4):408-420.\nHillman, A. J., M. C. Withers, and B. J. Collins. 2009. Resource Dependence Theory: A Review. Journal of Management 35 (6):1404-1427.\nHirshleifer, D., A. Low, and S. H. Teoh. 2012. Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? The Journal of Finance 67 (4):1457-1498.\nHitt, M. A., R. E. Hoskisson, and H. Kim. 1997. International diversification: Effects on innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firms. Academy of Management Journal 40 (4):767-798.\nIbarra, H. 1993. Network centrality,power,and innovation involvement: Determinants of technical and adminstrative roles. Academy of Management Journal 36 (3):471-501.\nJiao, H., Y. Wang, and M. Liu. 2019. The effect of the social network of the top management team on innovation in cultural and creative industries. Journal of Chinese Human Resources Management 10 (1/2):4-18.\nJohanson, J., and J.-E. Vahlne. 2003. Business relationship learning and commitment in the internationalization process. Journal of International Entrepreneurship 1 (1):83-101.\nJudge, G. G., R. C. Hill, W. E. Griffiths, H. Lütkepohl, and T. C. Lee. (1988). Introduction to the theory and practice of econometrics. New York, NY: Wiley.\nKafouros, M. I., P. J. Buckley, J. A. Sharp, and C. Wang. 2008. The role of internationalization in explaining innovation performance. Technovation 28 (1-2):63-74.\nKnudsen, M. P. 2007. The relative importance of interfirm relationships and knowledge transfer for new product development success. Journal of Product Innovation Management 24 (2):117-138.\nKogut, B. 2000. The network as knowledge: Generative rules and the emergence of structure. Strategic management journal 21 (3):405-425.\nKoka, B. R., and J. E. Prescott. 2008. Designing alliance networks: the influence of network position, environmental change, and strategy on firm performance. 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Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. Cambridge University Press.\nLove, J. H., and P. Ganotakis. 2013. Learning by exporting: Lessons from high-technology SMEs. International Business Review 22 (1):1-17.\nMaurer, I., V. Bartsch, and M. Ebers. 2011. The value of intra-organizational social capital: How it fosters knowledge transfer, innovation performance, and growth. Organization Studies 32 (2):157-185.\nMichel, J. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 1992. Diversificationposture and top management team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1):9-37.\nMusteen, M., J. Francis, and D. K. Datta. 2010. The influence of international networks on internationalization speed and performance: A study of Czech SMEs. Journal of World Business 45 (3):197-205.\nNahapiet, J., and S. Ghoshal. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review 23 (2):242-266.\nNienhüser, W. 2008. Resource dependence theory - How well does it explain behavior of organizations? Management Revue 19 (1/2):9-32.\nOviatt, B. M., and P. P. McDougall. 2005. Toward a theory of international new ventures. Journal of International Business Studies 36 (1):29-41.\nPakes, A., and M. Schankerman. 1984. The rate of obsolescence of patents, research gestation lags, and the private rate of return to research resources. University of Chicago Press.\nPfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 2003. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press.\nPhillips, J. O. L. 2018. Open innovation as means of building social capital: A way to globalization for traditional SMEs. Journal of Strategic Innovation and Sustainability 13 (2):115-126.\nPoppo, L., and T. Zenger. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal 23 (8):707-725.\nPreacher, K. J., and A. F. Hayes. 2008. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods 40 (3):879-891.\nRen, S., A. B. Eisingerich, and H.-T. Tsai. 2015. How do marketing, research and development capabilities, and degree of internationalization synergistically affect the innovation performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)? A panel data study of Chinese SMEs. International Business Review 24 (4):642-651.\nSavrul, M. 2016. The effect of innovation performance on dimensions of the globalization. Eurasian Eononometrics, Statistics and Emprical Economics Journal 3 (3):56-67.\nSmith-Doerr, L., and W. W. Powell. 2005. Networks and economic life. The Handbook of Economic Sociology 2 (3):379-402.\nSun, S. L., and R. P. Lee. 2013. Enhancing innovation through international joint venture portfolios: From the emerging firm perspective. Journal of International Marketing 21 (3):1-21.\nThorgren, S., J. Wincent, and D. Örtqvist. 2009. Designing interorganizational networks for innovation: An empirical examination of network configuration, formation and governance. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 26 (3):148-166.\nUlrich, D., and J. B. Barney. 1984. Perspectives in organizations: Resource dependence, efficiency, and population. Academy of Management Review 9 (3):471-481.\nWang, C.-H., C.-H. Chang, and G. C. Shen. 2015. The effect of inbound open innovation on firm performance: Evidence from high-tech industry. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 99 (10):222-230.\nWang, H., J. Zhao, Y. Li, and C. Li. 2015. Network centrality, organizational innovation, and performance: A meta‐analysis. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l`Administration 32 (3):146-159.\nWelch, L. S., and R. Luostarinen. 1988. Internationalization: evolution of a concept. Journal of General Management 14 (2):34-55.\nWellman, B., and S. D. Berkowitz. 1988. Social structures: A network approach. Vol. 2: CUP Archive.\nWilliamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications: a study in the economics of internal organization. Paper presented at Urbana-Champaign`s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship,University of Illinois.\nZahra, S. A., R. D. Ireland, and M. A. Hitt. 2000. International expansion by new venture firms: International diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning, and performance. The Academy of Management Journal 43 (5):925-950.; G0108353019; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/136293; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/136293/1/301901.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/136293
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202100719
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/136293/1/301901.pdf

المؤلفون: 鍾瑄萍, CHUNG, SHIUAN-PING

المساهمون: 會計與資訊學系

مصطلحات موضوعية: 創新強度, 國際化程度, 高階經理人團隊, 教育資本, 經營績效, Innovation, Internationalization, TMT, Education level, Operating Performance

وصف الملف: 102 bytes; text/html

Relation: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/113725; http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/bitstream/310904400/113725/1/index.html

الاتاحة: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/113725
http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/bitstream/310904400/113725/1/index.html

المؤلفون: 盧敬植

المساهمون: 財務管理學系

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人報酬, 部分鑑定法, 公司治理, 違約風險, Executive Compensation, Partial Identification, Corporate Governance, Default Risk

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Relation: 計畫編號 NSC 102-2410-H004-068; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/85707; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/85707/1/102-2410-H004-068.pdf

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/85707
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/85707/1/102-2410-H004-068.pdf

المؤلفون: 蕭凡恩, Hsiao, Fan-En

المساهمون: 梁嘉紋, Liang, Jia-Wen

مصطلحات موضوعية: 高階經理人與一般員工薪酬比揭露, 企業社會責任, 員工關係, Pay ratio disclosure, Corporate social responsibility, Employee relations

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الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/131469
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202001200

المؤلفون: 陳宣伯, Chen, Hsuan-Po

المساهمون: 謝永明, Hsieh, Yung-Ming

مصطلحات موضوعية: 平衡計分卡, 經營績效, 企業社會責任, 高階經理人薪酬, Balanced scorecards, Operating performance, Corporate social responsibility, Compensation

وصف الملف: 1740516 bytes; application/pdf

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G., and T. Kohers. 2002.The Link Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Journal of Business Ethics 35: 97-109.\n\n網路資源:\n許家偉，2017，金融業CSR 不能只有赤道原則，天下雜誌，2019取自https://csr.cw.com.tw/article/39922\n國泰金融集團企業永續網站，2019取自https://www.cathaybk.com.tw/cathaybk/csr/; G0107353037; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/130511; https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/130511/1/303701.pdf

الاتاحة: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/130511
https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202000496
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/130511/1/303701.pdf

المؤلفون: 林宜勉

المساهمون: 國立中興大學會計學系(所), 行政院國家科學委員會

مصطلحات موضوعية: 財務報表重編, 管理科學, 高階經理人離職及獎酬, 董事會獨立性, 資本結構, 自願性揭露, 應用研究

Relation: http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB/result.jsp?id=1290825& plan_no=NSC95-2416-H005-009& plan_year=95& projkey=PF9508-0202& target=plan& highStr=*& check=0& pnchDesc=%E9%AB%98%E9%9A%8E%E7%B6%93%E7%90%86%E4%BA%BA%E7%8D%8E%E9%85%AC%E5%8F%8A%E9%9B%A2%E8%81%B7%E3%80%81%E8%B3%87%E6%9C%AC%E7%B5%90%E6%A7%8B%E8%88%87%E8%B2%A1%E5%8B%99%E5%A0%B1%E8%A1%A8%E9%87%8D%E7%B7%A8; NSC95-2416-H005-009; http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55378

الاتاحة: http://hdl.handle.net/11455/55378