المؤلفون: 陳俊元

المساهمون: 法學評論

مصطلحات موضوعية: 會計師責任保險, 律師責任保險, 守門人, 公司治理, 強制保險, 強制揭露, 監督功能, 信號功能, 告知後同意, 法人會計師事務所, Accountant's Liability Insurance, Attorney's Liability Insurance, Gatekeeper, Corporate Governance, Mandatory Insurance, Mandatory Disclosure, Monitoring Function, Signaling Function, Informed Consent, Incorporated CPA Firm, droit, eco

Relation: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/124439/1/63.pdf; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/124439

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/124439/1/63.pdf
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/124439

المؤلفون: 陆地, 刘雁翎

المساهمون: 北京大学新闻与传播学院

المصدر: 万方 ; 知网 ; http://d.g.wanfangdata.com.cn/Periodical_xwahz201707009.aspx

مصطلحات موضوعية: 公共媒体, 传播研究, 媒体信息, 跨越式发展, 社交媒体, 监督功能, 热点事件, 社会价值, 传播主体, civil

Relation: 新闻爱好者. 2017, 34-36.; 1898952; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/465357

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/465357

المؤلفون: 陈冀周

المساهمون: 北京大学政府管理学院

المصدر: 知网

مصطلحات موضوعية: 媒体关系, 公共危机, 和谐互动, 新闻发言人, 媒体管理, 公众利益, 媒介素养, 舆论监督功能, 媒体行业, 舆论导向

Relation: 新闻战线.2014,(05),123-125.; 794051; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/40505

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/40505

المؤلفون: 袁刚

المساهمون: 北京大学政府管理学院

المصدر: 万方 ; http://d.g.wanfangdata.com.cn/Periodical_rdyj201205014.aspx

مصطلحات موضوعية: 人大代表, 官员, 比例, 参政议政, 民意代表, 行政岗位, 监督功能, 经验

Relation: 人大研究.2012,(5),40-40.; 1121862; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/42188

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/42188
https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1009-0932.2012.05.014

المؤلفون: 陆地, 梁斐

المساهمون: 北京大学新闻传播学院

المصدر: 知网

مصطلحات موضوعية: 广电媒体, 广播电视媒体, 媒体信息, 法制建设, 低俗化, 传播理论, 广播电视机构, 社会责任论, 国际社会, 监督功能

Relation: 中国广播电视学刊.2012,(07),10-12.; 864777; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/11764

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/11764

المؤلفون: 姜明安

المساهمون: 北京大学法学院, 北京大学公法研究中心

المصدر: 知网

مصطلحات موضوعية: 行政审判, 行政争议, 监督功能, 现代行政法, 救济功能, administrative, parties, administration, proceedings

Relation: 中国法律.2009,(04),8-67.; 920169; http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/101859

الاتاحة: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/101859

المؤلفون: 楊日青

المساهمون: 政治學系

مصطلحات موضوعية: 國會, 監督功能, 質詢, 備詢, 調查, 聽證, Congress, Oversight function, Interpellation, Question, Investigation, Public hearing

وصف الملف: 189 bytes; text/html

Relation: 行政院國家科學委員會; 計畫編號NSC86-2414-H004-030; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/69338; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/69338/3/index.html

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/69338
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/69338/3/index.html

المؤلفون: 洪莎嫚, Hung, Sha-Man

المساهمون: 邵宗海

مصطلحات موضوعية: 國會監督功能, 國會監督, 立法院監督功能, 立法院監督, 制衡, function of the congress oversight, congress oversight, Legislative oversight function, Legislative Yuan oversight, check and balance

Relation: A2002001192; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/84984; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/84984/1/index.html

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/84984
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/84984/1/index.html

المؤلفون: 洪莎嫚, Hung, Sha-Man

مصطلحات موضوعية: 國會監督功能, 國會監督, 立法院監督功能, 立法院監督, 制衡, function of the congress oversight, congress oversight, Legislative oversight function, Legislative Yuan oversight, check and balance

الاتاحة: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22A2002001192%22.

المؤلفون: 陳雅慧, Chen, Ya-Huei

المساهمون: 林子儀, Lin, Tzu-Yi, 臺灣大學:科際整合法律學研究所

مصطلحات موضوعية: 新聞自由, 第四權理論, 監督功能理論, 釋字五○九號解釋, 記者拒絕證言權, 言論自由, 業餘新聞業, freedom of the press, the fourth estate theory, checking value theory, J.Y. Interpretation No.509, journalist’s privilege of protecting confidential sources, freedom of the speech, amateur journalism

وصف الملف: 1902652 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: U0001-1808200921150100; http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/246246/186884; http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/186884/1/ntu-98-R94a41015-1.pdf

الاتاحة: http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/246246/186884
http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/186884/1/ntu-98-R94a41015-1.pdf

المؤلفون: 蔡孟娟

المساهمون: 戚務君

مصطلحات موضوعية: 評價功能, 監督功能, 董監持股, Valuation earnings sensitives, Compensation earnings sensitives, stock ownership by directors and supervisors

Relation: G0095353025; http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/94688

الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/94688

المؤلفون: 邱筱茜

المساهمون: 汪泱若

مصطلحات موضوعية: 董事會監督功能, 總經理權力, 家族管理, 董事會特性, Board monitoring, CEO power, Family management, Board characteristics

Time: 38

وصف الملف: 186185 bytes; 254379 bytes; 307847 bytes; 122902 bytes; 202471 bytes; 221708 bytes; 233798 bytes; 216481 bytes; 167801 bytes; 146880 bytes; application/pdf

Relation: 工商時報，2006.4.7，和艦殷鑑 許士軍：如果可以 最好拒絕獨董聘任。; 林宗輝與蔡彥卿，2007，獨立董事兼職與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，二零零七當前會計理論與實務研討會論文集。; 林秀鳳與李建然，2008，家族管理、外部董事會連結與企業價值之關聯，二零零八會計理論與實務研討會論文集。; 林宛瑩、戚務君與許崇源，2008，公司治理對企業公司價值與信用評等之不對稱影響，二零零八會計理論與實務研討會論文集，國立政治大學會計系。; 李秀玲與李佩陵，2008，淺談「公開發行公司董事會會議事辦法」強化董事會功能及相關配套機制推動情形，證券暨期貨月刊，第二十六卷，第3期：5-27。; 周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第四卷，第1期：115-139。; 孫秀蘭，1995，董事會制度與經營績效之研究，國立台灣大學財務金融學系碩士論文。; 張正源，2005，獨立董監制度與關係人交易關係之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。; 張志裕，2005，董事會特性、資訊揭露與經營績效之關聯性研究，私立中原大學企業管理學系碩士論文。; 陳錫銘，2005，經營者更迭、繼任者特性與股東附加價值關係之研究，國立中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。; 陳吉祥，2007，董事會組成及特性、總經理更換與公司績效變化，私立真理大學管理科學研究所在職碩士專班碩士論文。; 黃惠雯，2006，談證券交易法引進獨立董事及審計委員會等制度之緣起及重點，證券暨期貨月刊，第二十四卷，第3期：4-14。; 曾偉倫，2007，企業實施員工認股權制度與公司治理機制之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。; 傅迺婷，2003，二十一世紀公司治理的探索-台灣、美國比較性的觀點，私立中原大學會計學系碩士論文。; 劉連煜，2006，公開發行公司董事會、監察人之重大變革-證交法新修規範引進獨立董事與審計委員會之介紹與評論，證券櫃檯月刊，第116期（2月）：12-21。; 謝錦堂，2008，董事會功能理論模型之驗證：台灣上市公司董監事的觀點，管理學報，第二十六卷，第2期：127-144。; 薩門等著，2001，公司治理-哈佛商業評論精選，林宜賢與蔡慧菁譯，台北：天下遠見出版股份有限公司。; Adams, R. 2005. What do boards do? 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Park. 1999. The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 35-56.; Erickson, J., Y. W. Park, J. Reising, and H. H. Shin. 2005. Board composition and firm value under concentrated ownership: The Canadian evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13: 387-410.; Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307.; Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.; Fan, J. P. H. and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 401-425.; Ferris, S., M. Jagannathan, and A. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 58 (June): 1087-1111.; Goayal, V. K. and C. W. Park. 2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. 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Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? Working Paper, Ohio State University.; Ryan, H. and R. Wiggins. 2002. Whose is in whose pocket? Director compensation, bargaining power, and board independence. Working paper.; Ryan, H. and R. Wiggins. 2004. Whose is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics 73 (3): 497-524.; Ryan, H., L. Wang, and R. Wiggins. 2007. Learning, CEO power and board-of-director monitoring: Evidence from CEO tenure. Working Paper, Georgia State University.; Shivdasani, A. 1993. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 167-198.; Shivdasani, A. and D. Yermack. 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54 (October): 1829-1853.; Shivdasani, A. and E. M. Fich. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? 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الاتاحة: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw//handle/140.119/49564

المؤلفون: 郭美慧

مصطلحات موضوعية: 篩選監督功能, 市場力量功能, 認證功能, 初次公開上市(櫃), 創業投資, Venture Capital, Initial Public Offerings, Certification function, Screening and monitoring function, Market power function

وصف الملف: 148 bytes; application/octet-stream

Relation: http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11474; http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/11474/1/

الاتاحة: http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11474
http://ir.lib.ntust.edu.tw/bitstream/987654321/11474/1/

المؤلفون: 邱筱茜

مصطلحات موضوعية: 董事會監督功能, 總經理權力, 家族管理, 董事會特性, Board monitoring, CEO power, Family management, Board characteristics

الاتاحة: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0096353005%22.

المؤلفون: 蔡孟娟

مصطلحات موضوعية: 評價功能, 監督功能, 董監持股, Valuation earnings sensitives, Compensation earnings sensitives, stock ownership by directors and supervisors

الاتاحة: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0095353025%22.